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PREFACE
How risks are regulated in the US and the EU can affect domestic outcomes 
(such as the benefits and costs of protecting consumers, health and environ-
ment), and can also foster or limit the opportunities for international trade. 
This report is a revised version of a study commissioned by the European 
Parliament’s Committee on International Trade, written by the International 
Risk Governance Council and initially published by the EP Directorate-General 
for External Policies in 2016. This revised version reflects IRGC’s further edits 
in response to peer review comments. The study was charged with offering 
a descriptive transatlantic comparison of regulatory standards in four key 
sectors (food, automobiles, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals), chosen for their 
relevance both to consumer protection and transatlantic trade, focusing on 
whether different approaches to risk regulation may lead to different levels 
of protection. 
Transatlantic regulatory patterns overall, and in those four sectors in particu-
lar, indicate that EU risk regulation is not always or generally more stringent 
than US regulation. The reality is a complex mix of parity and particularity. 
While there is overall EU-US similarity, there is also variation. As to some 
risks, across and within sectors, it is the European regulation that is more 
stringent, whereas in others it is the US regulation. Even if they are unusual, 
such transatlantic regulatory differences can pose barriers to trade. Still, 
regulatory variation can also be the basis for learning to improve future reg-
ulatory design, both by comparing outcomes across regulations in different 
jurisdictions, and by planning adaptive regulation over time. International 
regulatory cooperation is not limited to adopting the current standard of one 
side or the other: it can also involve collaboration to review existing regulations 
and design new approaches that improve outcomes for all.
This report does not attempt to analyse the numerous factors that may explain 
why regulatory policies have arisen in the way they have, nor does it make 
suggestions as to which approaches may be preferable or recommendations 
as to how to resolve differences on specific regulations. The paper does, 





1 Introduction and overview 9
1.1 Regulatory variation and trade 9
1.2 Perceptions of EU and US regulation 10
1.3 The reality of EU and US regulation 10
1.4 Implications for trade agreements and regulatory cooperation 13
1.5 Outline of this report 14
2 Sectoral cases 15
2.1 Food safety risk regulation 15
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs), hormones in beef and dairy, 
antibiotics in animal production, mad cow disease (BSE/vCJD),  
pesticides, organic food, chlorine-washed poultry, trans fats in food, 
unpasteurised dairy products, choking hazards
2.2 Automobile safety standards 26
Vehicle safety regulation, compliance testing and enforcement for  
autos, future regulation of automated and autonomous vehicles,  
comparing traffic safety, automobile emissions
2.3 Chemical regulation 31
Chemical regulation in the United States, chemical regulation in  
Europe, comparison of the regulation approaches, transatlantic  
cooperation and its impacts, conclusions
2.4 Pharmaceuticals licensing and reimbursement 43
Introduction, context, current developments in Europe, current  
development in the US, conclusions: existing differences, current  
trends and emerging challenges
3 Conclusions and recommendations 53
3.1 A caveat on the effects of regulatory differences on industry practice 53
3.2 Findings 55
3.3 Implications for trade agreements and international regulatory cooperation 56
3.4 Learning from regulatory variation 57
3.5 Toward planned adaptive regulation 58






As international trade negotiators or regulatory bodies consider options to 
reconcile regulatory standards to reduce barriers to trade, concerns may arise 
that such efforts (whether via mutual recognition, harmonization, or other 
modes of “international regulatory cooperation”) might weaken regulatory 
protections. In this context, one viewpoint is that European regulatory 
standards have become more protective – more stringent and precautionary – 
than US regulatory standards, so that mutual recognition of current standards, 
or convergence on a new harmonized standard, might weaken European 
standards (although “harmonizing up” to higher standards is also possible). 
But the real pattern of actual regulation is more complex. Stringent policies 
have been pursued on both sides of the Atlantic, with frequent parity and 
occasional particular variation in both directions (sometimes greater European 
stringency, sometimes greater US stringency). Impact assessment and cost-
benefit analysis of regulation have also been employed on both sides. A 
key problem in claims of one jurisdiction’s greater stringency or precaution 
is sample selection bias: selectively citing prominent examples that draw 
media attention but that do not actually represent a general pattern or trend. 
A broader perspective is needed to represent the actual pattern of regulatory 
similarities and differences.
To help inform understanding and choices in such efforts, this report sum-
marizes the literature, and offers a descriptive transatlantic comparison of 
the actual pattern of regulatory standards in four key sectors.
Food
In some cases, European regulations are more stringent or precautionary. 
This is the case for genetically modified (GMO) foods, hormones in beef, 
and antibiotics in animal production. In other cases, US regulations are more 
stringent or precautionary, such as for mad cow disease (BSE/vCJD) in beef 
and especially in blood, trans fats (especially in labelling and broad phase-
out), unpasteurised dairy products, and choking hazards. Some cases reflect 
simultaneous precaution against conflicting risks but different methods, 
such as in poultry, where the US allows chlorine-washed chicken to reduce 
salmonella, while the EU restricts chlorine washing and imposes salmonella 
detection at source. And in still other cases, US and European regulations 
have converged through international regulatory cooperation, such as for 
organic food and possibly for pesticides.
Automobiles
The comparative safety of motor vehicles in Europe and the United States 
is a topic of growing importance, in part because global automakers are 
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seeking to offer the same (or similar) products to consumers throughout the 
world. Vehicle safety regulations in Europe and the US are different, and it 
is difficult to make a technical case that European vehicles are safer than 
American vehicles (or vice versa). Meanwhile, US standards for automobile 
air pollution emissions (especially NOx and PM2.5) are more stringent, and 
enforced more vigorously, than in Europe. The emergence of automated 
and autonomous vehicles provides a new opportunity for US-EU regulatory 
cooperation. 
Chemicals
At first glance the US approach to chemical regulation appears to be ”risk-
based” and the European approach ”precautionary”. Under the Toxics 
Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1976, the US EPA considers three im-
portant policy goals in setting standards to “prevent unreasonable risk” 
(especially from new chemicals): the effects of chemicals on human health 
and the environment; the benefits of use and the availability of substitutes; 
and the effects on the economy and innovation. Structural features of the 
US law-making system tend to encourage precautionary action, such as the 
threat of tort liability and the expansive authority of US agencies to interpret 
existing statutes to deal with new problems. The new Lautenberg Chemical 
Safety Act (LCSA) of 2016 will, among other changes, amend TSCA to in-
crease the testing of existing chemicals. On the European side, the REACH 
policy (since 2006) emphasizes testing and prioritization of existing as well as 
new chemicals, and setting regulatory standards to promote safer substitutes. 
Both regions still face problems with lack of data, high uncertainties of risk 
assessment, the burden of proof, the high cost of testing and low incentives 
for substitution of hazardous chemicals.  
Pharmaceuticals
The EU and the US have been converging in their approaches to drug licens-
ing, which is based on an assessment of safety and efficacy. Both regions 
aim to accelerate the licencing of pharmaceutical products thanks to adaptive 
approaches, with a view to enabling early access to drugs when there are 
unmet needs, and then using the data from monitoring such early access to 
evaluate whether broader access is warranted. Contrary to conventional wis-
dom, there do not appear to be differences in attitude to risk on a population 
level, despite some differences in regulation on a case by case basis. There 
are differences between the EU and the US in the structure of reimbursement 
(payment for medications by governments and insurers). Present trends 
suggest continuing convergence. In both the US and EU, we can expect to 
see greater patient involvement in defining meaningful benefit and willing-
ness to accept risks, with lifecycle approaches to the management of risks 
of products, and with integrated assessments of benefits as well as risks. 
Learning from regulatory variation,  
and international regulatory cooperation
The actual consequences of regulatory variation are not always simple. In-
dustry may respond to regulatory differences by producing different products 
to meet different standards in different jurisdictions, or by producing a single 
product that meets the most stringent standard, or by exiting the product 
Transatlantic patterns of risk regulation  // 7
market. This choice is highly sensitive to the costs of each production pro-
cess, and there does not seem to be a common pattern.
Moreover, the variation that we observe across risk regulations in the US 
and Europe is not always a problem: it can also be an important source of 
learning to inform better future choices. International regulatory cooperation 
aimed at reducing barriers to trade (via mutual recognition, harmonization, or 
other modes) begs the question of which standard to recognize or converge 
on. Studying observed regulatory variation, and even experimentation, can 
assess differences in outcomes from different regulatory approaches, better 
choices among current standards, and new approaches not yet adopted by 
either side. Both the US and Europe could benefit from such policy learning 
– to increase benefits, lower costs and avoid ancillary harms. Learning from 
regulatory variation requires careful analysis and international regulatory 
cooperation – to collect data, to structure comparisons, and to evaluate 
results through retrospective impact assessments. The EU and US have 
already engaged in significant regulatory cooperation, including on specific 
regulations and on their regulatory impact assessment systems.
Toward planned adaptive regulation
Further, trade agreements and other efforts at international regulatory coop-
eration could promote planned adaptive regulation (PAR) – an approach in 
which each regulation is not only reviewed retrospectively, but is designed 
from its initiation to collect data on performance, to learn from experience 
and to update over time. PAR is based on the premise that, in the face of 
uncertain forecasts of the future effects of a rule, regulators should plan 
for both monitoring (and revision of the risk assessment), and scheduled 
adaptive improvement of the rule (periodic future review and revision). PAR 
enables governments to take into account evolving evidence on the actual 
effects of their existing rules. PAR can be another key mechanism for policy 
learning – not only from regulatory variation across countries, but also from 
the ongoing accumulation of knowledge over time – to improve regulatory 
designs and outcomes.
Conclusion
The reality of transatlantic regulation is not a simple dichotomy of a European 
approach versus an American approach. It is not EU precaution versus US 
reaction, or ex-ante versus ex-post legal systems, or civil law versus com-
mon law, or uncertainty-based versus evidence-based regulatory systems. 
Rather, the reality is overall EU-US parity as well as some particular variation 
in policies on both sides of the Atlantic. This includes both cases of greater 
European stringency and cases of greater US stringency. The EU and US 
can learn from this variation, and from evolving understanding, to improve 
regulatory standards through monitoring, evaluation, impact assessment, 






1.1 Regulatory variation and trade
The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) have each developed 
systems of risk regulation that have enabled significant improvements in 
health, safety, environmental quality, security, and overall risk management 
on both sides of the Atlantic. These regulatory frameworks include an array 
of institutions, laws, policies, and regulatory instruments to prevent and 
manage risks that might threaten the environment, public health, safety and 
security of the public.
Across the regulatory standards in the EU and the US, there are both similar-
ities and differences. Even if two jurisdictions have broadly similar regulatory 
policies, the differences that do occur may give rise to trade disputes. ‘Unnec-
essary regulatory differences between countries persist as lingering barriers 
to trade even as traditional barriers are declining’ (Perez and Dudley 2016: 1). 
As tariffs on trade between the EU and the US have diminished, regulatory 
differences have become a focus of efforts to reduce barriers to expanding 
transatlantic trade, notably through the negotiation of regional agreements 
as well as through other modes of international regulatory cooperation (Bull 
et al. 2015).
Negotiating a trade agreement, or other modes of international regulatory 
cooperation, in order to reduce unnecessary regulatory barriers to trade raises 
questions about how the regulatory standards of the participating jurisdictions 
compare with each other, how these regulatory standards might change 
under the trade agreement, and what consequences such changes might 
entail. Some may hold the view that harmonizing regulatory standards into 
a single standard, or mutual recognition of each other’s differing standards, 
will enhance trade for mutual benefit. Others may hold the view that these 
steps will enhance trade but lead to less protective regulatory standards if 
they adopt the less restrictive regulation. This report aims to help inform 
these discussions by examining actual regulatory similarities and differences 
between the EU and the US.
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1.2 Perceptions of EU and US regulation 
A frequently expressed viewpoint is that European regulatory standards have 
become more protective – more stringent and precautionary (acting earlier and 
more stringently in the face of anticipated risk) – than US regulatory standards 
(e.g. Christoforou 2004; Cone 2005; Selin and VanDeveer 2006; Morag-Levine 
2011; Vogel 2012; Bradford 2012; see the literature survey in Wiener 2011a). In 
support of this view, adherents cite the adoption of the precautionary principle 
in European law (notably in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty), coupled with the rise 
of EU institutions, which are said to foster more stringent and proactive EU 
regulation in anticipation of possible future harm, yielding a reversal from the 
1970s-80s (when US regulation was seen as having been more protective 
than European regulation) to the era post-1990 (when European regulation is 
seen as having become more protective) (Vogel 2012). Adherents of this view 
also point to elements of the US system – such as the use of cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) to review proposed regulations, and the role of ex post civil 
tort liability to address risks that were not fully regulated ex-ante – to argue 
that the US approach is more reactive, waiting for evidence of harm before 
acting (Woolcock et al. 2015; Vogel 2012; Christoforou 2004). 
To bolster this viewpoint, examples cited of greater US precaution in the 
1970s-80s include the phaseouts of CFCs and of lead (Pb) in gasoline (petrol); 
examples cited of greater precaution in EU regulation after 1990 include food 
safety policies such as regarding hormones in beef and genetically modified 
foods, and environmental policies such as regarding toxic chemicals and 
climate change (Vogel 2012). The propensity for more protective EU reg-
ulations to be emulated in other countries has been dubbed the ‘Brussels 
Effect’ (Bradford 2012), suggesting that decisions taken in Brussels for the 
EU have a wider influence on policies and products around the world. This 
descriptive view of greater European regulatory precaution is evidently held 
by those who disagree on its normative merits, including both advocates and 
critics of such regulation (Wiener 2011a). 
1.3 The reality of EU and US regulation
This descriptive view of more protective European policies is not accurate. 
The real pattern of regulation is more complex: actual regulatory policies 
are more similar across the Atlantic, and, where they diverge, they point in 
both directions. 
Seen from a global context, the EU and the US are very similar in their 
levels of economic development, regulatory stringency, public health, and 
environmental quality, and both benefit from transatlantic trade; the strong 
contrasts that some observers and protagonists draw reflect a kind of ‘nar-
cissism of minor differences’ (Baldwin 2009). Precautionary policies have 
been pursued on both sides of the Atlantic, both before 1990 and after: 
although the EU has formally adopted the precautionary principle, the US 
also adopted precaution in several key statutes (including on air pollution 
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and endangered species) (Wiener 2007; Wiener et al. 2011). And cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) of regulation has been employed on both sides as well. In 
the US, economic analysis of the costs and benefits of regulation has been 
undertaken through Regulatory Impact Assessments required by executive 
order under every President since the 1970s. In the EU, analysis of costs 
and benefits is called for in the same article of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
that invokes the precautionary principle (now TFEU article 191), as well as 
in the European Commission’s Communication on the Precautionary Prin-
ciple (2000), the principle of “proportionality” in EU law, and the EU Impact 
Assessment system established since the early 2000s (Wiener and Ribeiro 
2016a). This combination of precaution with analysis of costs, benefits and 
countervailing risks, in real-world applications on both sides of the Atlantic, 
tends to produce more nuanced and varied policies than would either regu-
latory posture alone or in the abstract (Wiener 2002).
Overgeneralisations about wholesale differences between EU and US regu-
lation may be based on heuristic errors (Wiener 2011b; Wiener et al. 2013). 
A key problem is sample selection bias: citing prominent examples (case 
studies) does not necessarily demonstrate a general pattern or trend, because 
the examples or cases may not be an unbiased or representative sample 
of the full set of policies (Wiener et al. 2013). Candidly, Kagan and Axelrad 
(2000: 18) remarked of their own volume of case studies that it ‘cannot 
support unqualified generalisations about any of the national legal systems 
as a whole or about the across-the-board impact of national styles of law 
and regulation.’ Selective attention to unrepresentative samples of unusual 
policies may be more misleading than informative – it may only reflect the 
‘availability heuristic’ in which observers give undue extra weight to recent 
salient examples, rather than to broader patterns and trends (Kuran and 
Sunstein 1999). 
There are better ways to study the real patterns of EU and US regulation 
(Wiener et al. 2013). Rather than citing cases that are selected because they 
are prominent or salient, cases can be selected and data compared via more 
careful sampling approaches (Lieberman 2005). Indeed, an analysis of a more 
broadly representative array of regulatory standards – drawn from a random 
sample of all European and US risk regulation – indicates that over the past 
four decades, the EU and the US have actually been fairly similar, on average, 
in their degree of relative precaution, with only a slight increase in relative 
European precaution, not a significant shift (Hammitt et al. 2005; Swedlow et 
al. 2009; Wiener et al. 2013). This research found that the degree of precaution 
in US and European risk regulations has been, on average, about the same 
from 1970-present, with only a slight (less than 6%) increase in an index of 
relative European precaution since 1990 – not a wholesale shift to greater 
European precaution (Hammitt et al. 2005; Swedlow et al. 2009). This analysis 
also found that, within the sample, although several policies were shifting 
toward greater EU precaution over time, other policies were shifting toward 
greater US precaution over time, while most remained in parity. 
Beyond this overall similarity, there are some divergences between European 
and American regulatory policies. But they do not all lean toward greater pro-
tection in Europe. An extensive study involving both European and American 
experts to assess specific regulatory standards (Wiener et al. 2011) revealed 
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that the divergences in US and European precaution – which can yield dis-
cord and trade barriers and news media attention –go in both directions: 
sometimes greater EU precaution, but sometimes greater US precaution. 
For example, sometimes European regulation is more precautionary, such as 
regarding hormones in beef, genetically modified (GM) foods, toxic chemicals, 
and climate change; but sometimes US regulation is more precautionary, such 
as regarding Mad Cow disease (BSE/vCJD) in beef and in blood donations, 
air pollution (especially fine particulate matter, PM2.5), tobacco, counterter-
rorism measures, and others (Wiener et al. 2011). 
This research indicates that the reality of precaution has not been principle, it 
has been particularity: selective application of precaution to specific risks, on 
both sides of the Atlantic. On both sides, regulation has often been spurred 
by reaction to crises (van Asselt et al. 2014; Balleisen et al. 2017), which 
contributes to a shifting pattern of selective precautionary policies against 
future risks and hence potential trade conflicts. There is also variation in risk 
regulation within the US and within Europe – both across the member states 
of each, and across different ministries regulating different topical domains 
(Sand 2000; Zander 2010; Hamilton and Pelkmans 2015). 
In the present report, we update this analysis of case studies by examining 
regulatory similarities and differences across four key sectors, noted be-
low. Our detailed findings are presented in Chapter 2, and are summarised 
in Chapter 3. They show considerable variation in relative precaution and 
stringency across the EU and US. 
Thus, the reality is not a European approach versus an American approach. 
It is not EU precaution versus US reaction, or ex-ante versus ex-post legal 
systems, or civil law versus common law, or uncertainty-based versus evi-
dence-based regulatory systems. Rather, the reality is parity and particularity: 
both overall EU-US similarity, and also the selective application of precaution 
on both sides of the Atlantic, including cases of both greater European pre-
caution and cases of greater US precaution. 
To be sure, the cases examined in the present study were not selected in 
a random or representative sample, and so they may not support broader 
generalisations. But at least they show that the claimed generalisation of 
greater EU precaution is not accurate. The cases studied here were selected 
to assess some of the key sectors currently under negotiation between the US 
and EU. Across and within the four sectors studied here, there are differences 
not only in the regulatory standards but also in the relative impact of the reg-
ulations on the economy, on social well-being, and on innovation. And a full 
comparison of regulatory standards must be undertaken and characterised 
with care, to ensure attention not only to the official standards, but also to 
implementation, and to the surrounding institutional context, including other 
policies that also may affect outcomes (Wiener 2011b; Wiener et al. 2013). 
Meanwhile, there have been extensive efforts at EU-US regulatory coop-
eration. The US and EU have given mutual support in the creation of their 
horizontal systems of impact assessment and regulatory oversight, through 
the US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and its counterparts 
at the EU Impact Assessment Board (IAB) and now Regulatory Scrutiny Board 
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(RSB) (Graham 2014; Wiener and Ribeiro 2016a). In 2012, President Obama 
issued Executive Order 13,609, encouraging US federal agencies to under-
take regulatory cooperation with their counterparts in Europe, Canada and 
elsewhere (Bull et al. 2015). In Europe, regulatory cooperation has similarly 
been promoted by the Barroso and Juncker Commissions. Efforts have been 
undertaken to negotiate new regional trade agreements aimed at reducing 
regulatory barriers (Bull et al., 2015). Furthermore, it is important to note the 
efforts of the OECD, as a forum for sharing information and experiences on 
regulatory performance and effectiveness, organising regulatory collaboration 
on matters of economic and societal importance for OECD countries, and 
helping to spread shared approaches to regulatory quality, impact assess-
ment and oversight (De Francesco 2013). Thus, in fundamental ways, the EU 
and US regulatory systems have actually become more similar and mutually 
constructive over time.
1.4 Implications for trade agreements 
and regulatory cooperation
The transatlantic regulatory differences that exist, even if they are unusual 
deviations from typical parity, and even if they go in both directions, can still 
pose barriers to trade. Regulatory differences can complicate trade both for 
large enterprises and perhaps especially for small and medium-sized en-
terprises (SMEs). Harmonizing regulatory standards, mutual recognition, or 
other forms of international regulatory cooperation, could potentially reduce 
such barriers and enhance trade for mutual benefit.
At the same time, converging regulatory standards to reduce barriers to trade 
may raise a concern that doing so might entail relaxing regulatory protections 
on one side or even both sides. For those who hold the descriptive compara-
tive viewpoint discussed above – the view that European regulatory standards 
are always or generally more protective than US regulatory standards – the 
normative concern may be that reducing regulatory barriers to trade would 
entail weakening European regulatory protections. This concern has been 
expressed as a criticism of regional trade agreements, and could also arise 
regarding other modes of international regulatory cooperation. 
Even if this descriptive comparative viewpoint were accurate (which it is not, 
as discussed above), it would not necessarily follow that harmonizing stand-
ards requires weakening European regulatory protections, because the trade 
agreement could ‘harmonise up’ to more stringent standards, rather than 
‘harmonise down’ to less stringent standards. This is an issue of negotiation.
The reality, as described above, is a more complex array of EU-US parity and 
particularity, going in both directions (sometimes more stringent European 
protections, sometimes more stringent US protections). Our study of 4 key 
sectors in this report adds further evidence to this complex reality. 
In this situation, harmonizing transatlantic regulations, or other modes of 
international regulatory cooperation, could entail a mix of changes that makes 
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(some) protections more stringent on each side of the Atlantic. And even if 
regulatory convergence is not attained or sought, there can still be benefits 
from international regulatory cooperation, such as from sharing information on 
tests, inspections, clinical trials, and impact assessments (both prospective 
and retrospective). International regulatory cooperation can take advantage 
of regulatory differences to study their consequences and learn how to de-
sign even better policies (Wiener and Alemanno 2015). We discuss these 
opportunities further in chapter 3.
1.5 Outline of this report
Thus, there is a need to examine the evidence on actual regulatory similarities 
and differences across the Atlantic, and the implications for trade agreements. 
In order to help clarify the similarities and differences in EU and US regula-
tion, Chapter 2 of this report offers a descriptive transatlantic comparison of 





These sectors were selected because of their prominence in transatlantic 
economic activity and in trade negotiations; they are not a representative 
sample of all regulated sectors. In each sector, the report illustrates the vari-
ation in regulatory approaches (this report focuses on risk regulatory systems 
at the EU level and the US federal level, with some attention to policies in 
the EU member states and the US states). In some cases, the report iden-
tifies current or potential opportunities for regulatory cooperation, in order 
to shed light on how transatlantic trade could be facilitated while sustaining 
high levels of protection. 
Chapter 3 begins by attempting to assess how industry responds to these 
regulatory differences, such as by producing different products to meet dif-
ferent regulatory standards in different jurisdictions, or by producing a single 
product that meets the most stringent standard. Then the chapter summa-
rises our findings across the four sectors, highlighting that such regulatory 
variation can offer opportunities for international regulatory cooperation to 
invest in learning to improve future regulatory design. Regulatory learning 
can be gained both by comparing outcomes across regulations in different 




2.1 Food safety risk regulation
Food safety regulation includes a variety of subtopics. In this section, we 
review 10 cases of food safety regulation. These ten cases, selected by their 
prominence and diversity (not as a random or representative sample of all 
food safety policies), suggest that the relative degree of stringency or pro-
tection in US and European policies is not uniform but varies among these 
subtopics. Thus, claims that European food safety standards are generally 
more stringent or precautionary than US food safety standards do not appear 
to be accurate. In some cases, European regulations are more stringent, such 
as for genetically modified (GMO) foods, hormones in beef, and antibiotics in 
animal production. In other cases, US regulations are more stringent, such 
as for mad cow disease (BSE/vCJD) in beef and especially in blood, trans 
fats, unpasteurised dairy products, and choking hazards. Some cases reflect 
simultaneous precaution against conflicting risks, such as chlorine-washed 
chicken to reduce salmonella. And in still other cases, US and European 
regulations have converged through international regulatory cooperation, 
such as for organic food and possibly for pesticides.
2.1.1 
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
Genetically modified plants
Regulations may address genetically modified (GM) foods as they reach the 
consumer, the cultivation of GM crops by farmers, or both. The European 
Union generally takes a more precautionary approach to GM plants than the 
United States (Law Library of Congress 2014). USDA reported in 2014 that 
about 90 percent of all US corn (maize), cotton, and soy fields were plant-
ed with GM varieties (Fernandez-Cornejo et al. 2014). In contrast, by 2015 
only one GM cultivar (MON810, a corn plant) had been approved in the EU, 
although other GM products are being imported as feed, and new varieties 
are pending approval through the regulatory process (Valeeva et al. 2015). 
Worldwide, about 12 percent of all cropland is planted with GM crops, and 
of all GM crops, about 40% are grown in the United States (US NAS 2016).
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European Union
Under its multi-tiered decision process for authorizing GMOs, both EU-level 
and member state approvals are needed for GM plants to be authorised: the 
EU-level institutions may allow the marketing and import of GM products 
for food and animal feed, but the individual member states may opt out, 
and the member states may also restrict the cultivation of GM plants. This 
decision process was set forth in a Communication from the Commission 
on 22 April 2015 (European Commission 2015d; for flow charts and updated 
materials, see European Commission 2016e). Over the last two decades, 
the EU has developed a series of legislative enactments on GM food and 
crops, including Regulation No. 1829/2003 on Genetically Modified Food and 
Feed (European Commission 2003), Directive 2001/18/EC on the Deliberate 
Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms (Europe-
an Commission 2001)—later amended by Directive 2008/27/EC (European 
Commission 2008)—and Directive (EU) 2015/412 (March 2015), which allows 
the individual Member States more autonomy to restrict the use of GM crops 
in their territory (European Commission 2015c), even if the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA) and the European Commission have authorised them. 
(Such discretion for each member state implies that international regulatory 
cooperation efforts by the US federal government may need to engage each 
member state rather than or in addition to the EU level institutions.)
United States
The United States, by contrast, operates under the 1986 Coordinated Frame-
work (OSTP 1986), regulating GM products under the statutes applicable 
to each product or application. The US does not have federal legislation to 
regulate genetic modification as a process or technique, but rather takes a 
risk-based approach to regulation of the products of biotechnology and other 
processes for breeding plants (OSTP 1992). The White House announced 
a review of the Coordinated Framework in 2015 (Holdren et al. 2015). In 
May 2016, the US National Academy of Sciences released a report finding 
that there is a diverse array of breeding and modification techniques rather 
than a simple dichotomy between GM and non-GM plants, and that risks 
and benefits depend on specific product characteristics rather than on the 
process or technique used to modify the plant (US NAS 2016). For example, 
it found that one modification, growing GM crops with pesticidal proper-
ties encoded in the plant (such as Bt-corn), has led to reduced spraying of 
chemical pesticides, while a different modification, growing GM crops that 
are herbicide-resistant, has led to increased spraying of herbicides (such as 
Roundup, containing glyphosate) (NAS 2016). The US Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) regulates GMOs based on its authority to determine the 
safety of ‘food additives’ under the FFDCA (21 USC. §§ 301–399f 2012) and 
in a 1992 policy statement (US FDA 1992) the FDA decided that GM foods 
would be classified as Generally Recognized As Safe (GRAS) unless they are 
significantly different from other food in structure and form. FDA has approved 
several GM foods, both to benefit farming and to benefit consumers, such 
as the Simplot potato designed to reduce acrylamides. 
Vermont became the first US state to pass a law requiring the labelling of 
GMO organisms in food in 2014 (General Assembly of the State of Vermont 
2014). Proposed legislation is pending in the US Congress to replace state 
labelling laws with a national labelling standard (US Congress 2014). Some 
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local governments of the US also have passed legislation to prohibit the 
cultivation of GMOs, such as Marin County in California.
Studies find that the increase in GM crops in the US has been associated with 
reduced use of chemical pesticides (replaced by pesticidal properties engi-
neered into plant crops) and increased use of chemical herbicides (applied 
to plant crops engineered to be herbicide-tolerant) (Klumper and Qaim 2014). 
Genetically engineered fish
European Union
Currently, no GM animals (such as fish) or derived products are on the EU 
market, nor have any applications for GM animals been received in the EU. 
The European Commission asked the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
to develop comprehensive risk assessment guidelines to evaluate the pos-
sible risks of GM animals for food and feed safety, which were published 
in 2012 (EFSA 2012). The risk assessment guidelines compare GM animals 
and derived food and feed with conventional counterparts, and recommend 
post-market monitoring to identify unintended effects of GM after the prod-
uct has been authorised (EFSA 2012). EFSA risk assessments would also 
consider human health risks from pathogens carried by fish, and allergic 
responses to operators from contact (EFSA 2012). EFSA does not itself set 
regulatory standards, which remain the role of the European Commission 
(primarily DG Santé). 
United States
On November 19, 2015, the FDA approved the sale of AquAdvantage salmon 
to US consumers (Dunham 2015), marking the first genetically engineered 
(GE) animal product approved for human consumption. FDA reviewed the GE 
salmon under its authority for ‘new animal drugs’ (US FDA 2015b1, 2015b2). 
This approval came almost twenty years after AquaBounty’s first submission 
of data to the FDA (Naik 2010). The approval is strictly applicable to sterile 
females grown by AquaBounty in one on-land breeding facility in Canada 
and one grow-out facility in Panama, with consideration for environmental 
and food safety guidelines (Dunham 2015; US FDA 2015b3). FDA did not yet 
approve any GE salmon to be grown in the US. 
The FDA assessed the food safety of GE salmon by comparing it to non-ge-
netically engineered farmed Atlantic salmon, finding that eating the same 
quantity of both salmon products is equally safe and equally nutritious and the 
two products are not ‘materially’ different (US FDA 2015b1, US FDA 2015b2, 
Smith et al. 2010). FDA used both AquaBounty’s research and peer-reviewed 
literature to ascertain safety of the product. FDA requires on-going self-re-
porting of safety and environmental impact.
At this time, there has not yet been a sale of GM salmon in the US. The 2016 
federal spending bill enacted by Congress stipulated that GM salmon may not 
be sold until the FDA publishes labelling guidelines for consumer use (which 
FDA is currently considering). In early 2016, the FDA banned imports of GE 
salmon until the agency publishes guidelines for how the product should 
be labelled (Dennis 2016). The approval of AquAdvantage salmon initially 
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had no stipulations for product labelling when sold to consumers, but had 
requirements for labelling the eggs when they are transported.
2.1.2 
Hormones in beef and dairy
EU regulation of hormones in beef and dairy has been more stringent than 
US regulation. The US FDA regulates the use of hormones in beef and dairy 
cows, focusing on the safety of the end consumer product. The EU, however, 
banned imports of hormone-treated beef from the US, citing public concern, 
animal welfare, and the unnaturalness of hormonally altering animals to grow 
and produce at accelerated rates (Gray et al. 2011). The US and Canada 
protested the EU’s beef ban to the World Trade Organization in 1997, which 
ruled that the EU measure, lacking a risk assessment, violated the Agree-
ment on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS 
agreement). The WTO panel, affirmed by its appellate body in 1998, ruled 
that under the SPS agreement such a measure must be based on relevant 
assessment of the risks to human health, which had yet to be substantiated. 
The WTO then authorized the US and Canada to impose added tariffs on EU 
food products. After continuing disputes over the science and the tariffs, the 
US and EU signed a memorandum of understanding in May 2009 that seeks 
to phase in changes – to allow market access in Europe for some US beef 
raised without growth promoting hormones, and to limit higher US tariffs on 
European foods – but leaving a full resolution to be addressed in further talks 
(Johnson 2015b). Meanwhile, despite differing regulatory stances on the use 
of recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST), which US federal regulations 
allow but EU rules prohibit, US-produced butter, lactose, milk albumins, 
concentrated milk proteins, and milk powders circulate within the EU market 
and European dairy products are sold in the US (US FDA 2015, WHO 2014a, 
Sechen 2013, European Commission 2016, European Association of Dairy 
Trade 2011). 
2.1.3 
Antibiotics in animal production
The European Union has taken a more protective and whole-systems ap-
proach than the US on the issue of antibiotic use among food animals. By 
a decision taken in 2005, the EU banned the use of antibiotics for growth 
promotion in 2006 (European Commission 2005). In March 2016 the European 
Commission and European Parliament adopted the ‘Animal Health Law’ to 
reduce the use of antimicrobial medicines by promoting better overall health 
of animal populations (European Commission 2016c). The EU has also banned 
specific antibiotics from being used in animals that the United States De-
partment of Agriculture has not yet banned—for example, avoparcin in 2006. 
Denmark has adopted one of the most stringent policies to limit antibiotic 
use in animals (Wielinga and Schlundt 2012). In March 2015, the US adopted 
a “National Action Plan for Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria,” which 
included (among several other measures) a goal of eliminating the use of 
medically-important antibiotics for growth promotion in food-producing an-
imals by the year 2020, and the establishment of a common U.S.-European 
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Union (EU) system for sharing and analyzing bacterial resistance patterns 
for priority pathogen. 
There have been several attempts at international coordination on policies 
regarding antimicrobial resistance and antibiotics used in animal farming. 
One example is the EU/USA Transatlantic Task Force on AMR (2009) (see 
cdc.gov/drugresistance/tatfar). WHO provided guidance in its Global Prin-
ciples for the Containment of Antimicrobial Resistance in Animals Intended 
for Food (WHO 2000), and in its series of Critically Important Antimicrobial 
reports (WHO 2012), which ranked antibiotics as ‘critically important, highly 
important, and important’ and supplemented the Codex Alimentarius guide-
lines established by the WHO and FAO. 
2.1.4 
Mad cow disease (BSE/vCJD)
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) (commonly known as mad cow 
disease) is a type of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) that is 
transmitted primarily when an animal ingests high-infectivity tissues, princi-
pally from the central nervous system (brain, spine and related tissues), of 
a TSE-infected animal (Anderson et al. 1996; Gray et al. 2011). An epidemic 
of BSE occurred in the late 1980s, predominantly in the United Kingdom, 
when rendered animal protein including infectious tissues from BSE-infect-
ed cattle and scrapie-infected sheep was used as a protein supplement in 
cattle feed (Wilesmith et al. 1991).The epidemic probably started in the UK 
between 1981-1982 (Wilesmith et al. 1991) with the peak in January 1993 
(US FDA 1997). On March 20, 1996, the UK reported the appearance of a 
new variant form of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD), a TSE of humans that 
usually appears in older people but which was now appearing in younger 
people, raising the inference that this vCJD may have come from humans 
eating BSE-infected beef (Gray et al. 2011; US FDA 2010, updated 2016). 
According to the FDA, through May 2015, 228 patients, including 177 in the 
U.K., 27 in France and 25 in ten other countries (including four in the US and 
two in Canada), had been diagnosed with clinical vCJD, with deaths in the 
UK appearing to peak in the year 2000, although future cases may appear 
years after exposure (US FDA 2010, updated 2016, p.5).
As detailed below, US regulation has been more precautionary than EU reg-
ulation regarding BSE in imported beef, and in blood donations; European 
regulation has been tighter on testing of cows at slaughter; and both sides 
have adopted bans on animal feed. As to imported beef from places with 
BSE (mainly the UK), the US adopted its import ban earlier than did the EU, 
and maintained this import ban for much longer. As to blood, the US adopted 
earlier and more stringent measures than did the EU to safeguard the blood 
supply against the risk of vCJD. Meanwhile, the EU adopted a policy on 
testing all beef at slaughter (later relaxed), while the US tested those cattle 
exhibiting signs of illness. As to animal feed, the EU acted formally to ban 
rendered animal products in animal feed earlier than the US (the EU adopt-
ed its ban in 1994 and the US in 1997, although a ban had been voluntarily 
applied in the US since 1990), but the US adopted its feed ban before BSE 
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was detected in US cows, while the EU adopted its feed ban after BSE had 
been detected in European cows. 
United States
The US Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of USDA banned 
the import of UK ruminants and some cattle products in 1989, and in 1991 
(USDA 1991) further restricted importation of ruminant meat, meat products 
and by-products from all countries with confirmed cases of BSE (Gray et al. 
2011). In 1997, APHIS broadened the import ban to include all beef imports 
from all EU countries (USDA 2000; Gray et al. 2011). After the first BSE case 
was found in the US, APHIS adopted new domestic regulations limiting 
nervous system tissues and ruminant blood in feed. The US ban on UK beef 
is still in place. In March 2014, the US lifted the 15-year ban on beef from the 
EU and in January 2015 Ireland was the first EU country approved to export 
beef to the US (McFarren 2015). 
In 2003 Japan suspended imports of US beef after a single case of BSE 
was observed in the US, and in July 2006 Japan lifted the ban on imports 
of US beef from cattle 20 months of age and younger (Strom and Tabuchi 
2013). Lacking a test to detect BSE in a live animal, USDA’s BSE surveillance 
program sampled approximately 40,000 animals each year for BSE and 
targeted cattle populations where the disease is most likely to be found, 
including cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous disorders, emaciation or 
injury (USDA 2000). In 2013, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
granted the US negligible risk status for BSE (USDA 2013). 
In 1999, the US FDA also adopted ‘precautionary measures’ to restrict blood 
donors who had spent over 6 months in the UK or 5 years in Europe during 
the BSE outbreak, despite the uncertain nature of human-to-human trans-
mission of vCJD via blood (Gray et al., 2011), but based on the ‘theoretical 
possibility’ of such transmission (US FDA 2010, updated 2016). In 2002 the 
FDA went further, deferring any blood donor who had spent 3 months or more 
in the UK or 5 years or more anywhere in Europe in 1980-1996 or anyone 
who had received a blood transfusion in the U.K. from 1980-2001 (US FDA 
2002; Gray et al. 2011). FDA estimated that the new policy might lead to a 
loss of 4.6% to 5.3% of blood donors with a 72% reduction in existing vCJD 
risk, for a total reduction of 90% relative to the risk that had existed prior 
to implementation of the 1999 recommendations (US FDA 2010, updated 
2016). The FDA continues to maintain these policies deferring blood donors 
(US FDA 2014; US FDA 2010, updated 2016).
European Union
Individual countries, including France, West Germany, Italy and Russia, 
banned the import of British beef in the early 1990’s and lifted the bans in 
1994 when the EU agreed to tighten regulations and adopt a feed ban to 
prevent the spread of BSE (Gray et al., 2011). One week after the 1996 UK 
report of vCJD was issued, the European Commission banned all exports of 
beef, live cattle and beef products from the UK on March 27, 1996 (Europe-
an Commission 1996). In November 1998, the EC lifted the export ban and 
required EU Member States to lift their import bans on British beef; France 
maintained its ban (Council of the European Union 1998), and the EU sued 
France to force it to lift its ban (European Court of Justice 2003; Gray et al. 
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2011). In 2000, the EU applied strict regulations on the use of animal pro-
tein in all animal feeds (Council of the European Union 2000). In 2001, the 
European Council started requiring testing for all slaughtered cattle over the 
age of thirty months (Freeman 2002; EC 2010), while the US has only tested 
cattle exhibiting signs of illness. In 2013, the EU Standing Committee on 
the Food Chain and Animal Health discontinued mandatory BSE testing of 
healthy slaughtered animals, but some individual member states continue 
to implement mandatory testing. 
The EU adopted no EU-wide restriction on blood donation regarding BSE, 
but some individual EU member states did adopt such restrictions: for ex-
ample, since 2000, France, Austria, Finland, Germany and Ireland (and also 
Switzerland) adopted restrictions on blood donated by people who had lived 
in the UK for longer than 6 or 12 months between 1980 and 1996 (O’Neill 
2003) (Gray et al. 2011) 1. 
2.1.5 
Pesticides
The US generally has adopted more stringent limits on exposure to pesticides 
in food than has the EU. In the EU, Member States and the European Food 
Safety Authority determine maximum residue levels (MRLs) for pesticides 
in food on a case-by-case basis, whereas the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) uses a cumulative risk assessment approach for all pesticides 
that yields a more conservative Acceptable Daily Intake (ADI) level for indi-
viduals (Barlow et al. 2015). US EPA ADIs have typically been more stringent 
than WHO recommended ADIs (Brock et al. 2003). 
In the US, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 
gives EPA authority to regulate pesticides (7 USC. § 136a (a)), while FDA and 
USDA supervise pesticide residues in food. For example, regarding the herbi-
cide Roundup (containing glyphosate), EPA registered the herbicide for use, 
and in 2016 FDA began monitoring for glyphosate residues on food (Gillam 
2016). In the EU, Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 gives the European Food 
Safety Authority, the European Commission, and Member States the power 
to assess and authorise ‘plant protection products’ (European Commission 
2009). (See also the section of this report on Chemicals) 
Of course, in particular cases, EU standards may be more stringent than US 
standards: for example, the European Commission implemented a 2-year 
ban on neonicotinoid pesticides (due to concerns about impacts on pollinator 
insects) starting in 2013 (Gross 2013), while in the US, the federal EPA has 
not issued such a ban (though it is now reviewing all neonicotinoid pesticides, 
see epa.gov/pollinator-protection), and in May 2016, one state, Maryland, 
passed a bill banning the use of neonicotinoids by consumers, beginning in 
2018 (Maryland General Assembly 2016; Springuel 2016). 
1 See ec.europa.eu/health/blood_tissues_organs/blood/become_blood_donor_en.
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2.1.6 
Organic food
In the United States, the US Department of Agriculture sets standards for or-
ganic foods under the 1990 Organic Food Production Act (7 US Code Chapter 
94). The European Council of Agricultural Ministers passed a 2007 regulation 
(Council Regulation (EC) No. 834/2007 (European Commission 2007, Europe-
an Commission 2014). Although a greater percentage of farmland in the EU 
is certified organic than in the US, the US produces more organic products 
for the market (Dimitri and Oberholtzer 2005); in 2010 the US surpassed the 
EU as the largest organic market in the world (Dias et al. 2015). 
Despite some regulatory differences, the US and EU reached an agreement 
in 2012 on common standards that enable organic products from each ju-
risdiction to be marketed in the other (European Commission 2015). This 
agreement is an example of US-EU cooperation and convergence on regu-
latory standards for food safety.
2.1.7 
Chlorine-washed poultry
In the early 1990s, salmonella could be found in up to 60 percent of fresh 
chickens sold in the US (Burros 1992). By 2013, Consumer Reports found 
this bacterium on just 11 percent of supermarket chicken samples (Andrews 
2014). Chickens in European stores appear to have lower rates of salmonella 
(Andrews 2014). The US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that 
1 million cases of salmonella-related illness occur each year in the US, with 
around 380 deaths (CDC 2015). The European Food Safety Authority says 
that more than 100,000 salmonella cases are reported annually in the EU 
(EFSA 2014), but these reports understate the true number of cases: ‘At the 
EU-level, the under-ascertainment ratio of clinical illness is expected to range 
between 5 and 100 in different [member states]. This would imply that in the 
EU27 the approximately 130,000 verified of human salmonellosis cases would 
translate into not less than 1 million and possibly as high as 15 million cases 
of clinical salmonellosis per year’ (EFSA 2010: 8). 
The US allows pathogen reduction treatments (PRTs) in poultry, such as 
‘chlorine-washed chicken,’ to mitigate the threat of salmonella and other 
microbes entering the consumer food supply (US FDA 2016a). US FDA regu-
lations permit chlorine dioxide levels up to 3 ppm for poultry washing (US FDA 
2016a). The EU approach seeks to remove infected birds and contaminated 
meat at each stage of the production process (EFSA 2010). Since 1997, the 
EU has banned imports of US poultry because of PRTs (e.g. chlorine-washed 
chicken). The US has initiated proceedings in the WTO to challenge the EU’s 
ban of chlorine-washed chicken. 
Controversy continues on the issue of chlorine-washed chicken (Capelouto 
2014, Friends of the Earth Europe 2015, Faiola 2014, Johnson 2015a, APPPT 
2015, European Union 2002, European Commission 2016). But rather than 
demonstrating that US regulatory standards are less stringent, this example 
is better seen as reflecting simultaneous precaution in the US and EU against 
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two conflicting risks: the risk of chlorine residue on food or in water, and the 
risk of salmonella or campylobacter on food that the chlorine washing is 
intended to reduce. Salmonella is a concern for both the US and EU, with 
each taking a different approach to mitigating disease risks. Complicating 
this comparison are the differing amounts of poultry production in the US and 
EU, differing poultry production methods, and differing methods of reducing 
poultry-borne pathogen risks. 
2.1.8 
Trans fats in food
US federal regulation is more stringent than EU level regulation regarding 
trans fats in food, notably from partially hydrogenated oils (PHOs). But there 
are notably protective policies in some EU member states.
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, studies showed a strong association 
between trans fat intake and cardiovascular disease risk, with estimates 
rising to perhaps 100,000 deaths per year in the US (Zaloga et al. 2006; 
Mozaffarian et al. 2006). On July 11, 2003, US FDA issued a rule requiring 
the quantity of trans fat content to be listed in the Nutrition Facts label on 
packaged foods by the year 2006 (68 Fed. Reg. 41434) (see US FDA 2003). 
This national labeling requirement led many food companies to reduce their 
trans fat content to zero. 
Also in 2003, Denmark adopted a policy limiting trans fat content to no more 
than 2 g per 100 g of total fat, leading to about a 90% reduction in consumer 
intake (WHO 2014b). Other European countries that have since adopted 
similar near-bans on trans fats include Austria, Hungary, Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland. “Despite this progress, the lack of policies or bans in many parts 
of the European Region remains a serious concern. … consumption remains 
high where no policies are in place. For example, a recent study revealed that 
people could consume as much as 30 g trans fat per day in some eastern 
countries in the Region. This is a concern, as consumption of only 5 g per 
day is associated with a 23% increase in the risk of coronary heart disease. 
Even in European Union countries, high levels of trans fats can still be found 
in some food categories, and there is some evidence of higher consumption 
in low socioeconomic groups.“ (WHO 2014b).
In 2013, US FDA announced a preliminary determination that PHOs would 
no longer be generally recognised as safe (GRAS), which was made final on 
June 16, 2015 (US FDA 2015a; US FDA 2016b). FDA says that ‘This action 
is expected to reduce coronary heart disease and prevent thousands of 
fatal heart attacks each year in the United States’ (US FDA 2016b). FDA’s 
central estimates of the costs and benefits of this regulation over 20 years 
are $6 billion and $140 billion, respectively (US FDA 2015d: part VII). Food 
companies have a three-year period from 2015 to 2018 to eliminate PHOs, or 
otherwise seek an exemption from the FDA (US FDA 2015a; US FDA 2016b). 
The EU level has moved more slowly than the US federal government to reg-
ulate trans fats. Although EFSA released a report on the cardiovascular risks 
of trans fat consumption in 2004 (EFSA 2004), the European Commission has 
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not yet adopted a regulation banning trans fats from the food supply across 
Europe. The Commission adopted a report in December 2015 outlining the 
health effects of trans fatty acids in the European diet (European Commission 
2015). Although Denmark and some other EU member states have adopted 
stringent policies, as noted above, the UK, Germany, France and other Eu-
ropean countries have not, instead relying on consumer pressure rather than 
on government regulation to convince companies to self-regulate to remove 
trans fats from their recipes (Coombes 2011; WHO 2014b). In late 2016, the 
EU released an initial Impact Assessment on its potential future regulation 
of trans fat intake (European Commission 2016f).
2.1.9 
Unpasteurised dairy products
The United States generally has more stringent standards related to pas-
teurisation of dairy products than the European Union, limiting the import 
of some European cheeses into the US, in order to prevent exposure to mi-
crobial pathogens such as Campylobacter, Salmonella, E. coli, and Listeria 
(CDC 2016). FDA prohibits the import or interstate sale of raw milk for human 
consumption, and of products of raw milk for human consumption such as 
cheese, yogurt and butter (NCSL 2015). Thus the US requires pasteurisation 
more stringently, and some popular European cheeses such as traditional 
French reblochon are therefore not available in the US. 
US FDA’s Pasteurised Milk Ordinance (PMO) is a model rule for the pro-
duction, processing, packaging and sale of raw milk and dairy products in 
the United States; an early version of the PMO was issued in 1924 (US FDA 
2015c). The FDA regularly revises the ordinance, which defines ‘Grade A’ 
dairy products, with input from the National Conference on Interstate Milk 
Shipments (NCIMS), a voluntary cooperative body of state and federal indus-
try and government representatives that meets biennially (US FDA 2015c). 
Based on the federal PMO, 46 out of 50 states have adopted the PMO to 
regulate sales of raw milk within their states (California, Maryland, New York 
and Pennsylvania have not adopted the PMO, but have their enacted their 
own strict milk safety laws) (NCSL 2015). 
By contrast, the sale, marketing, and distribution of raw milk are legal in the 
EU, with some provisions on production and labelling of the product (Corri-
gendum to Regulation (EC) No 853 2004). The EU does, however, regulate 
the somatic cell count (SCC) and bacterial standard plate count (SPC) for raw 
cow’s milk imports and domestic products: ≤ 400,000 per ml and ≤ 100,000 
per ml, respectively, according to a 2004 EU regulation (Corrigendum to 
Regulation (EC) No 853 2004). Under current regulations, the US has a maxi-
mum SCC of ≤ 750,000 per ml and bacterial SPC of ≤ 100,000 per ml (USDA 
AMS 2012). These requirements apply at the farm level for EU products and 
imports, whereas they apply to the processing or distribution level in the US. 
In 2012, the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service established a voluntary EU 
Health Certificate program for US producers to become certified to export 
dairy products into the EU (USDA AMS 2012). 
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Another strategy for killing microbial contamination in food – irradiation – is 
allowed in the US for a wide variety of foods, notably meats, whereas in the 
EU it is limited to the category of dried aromatic herbs, spices and vegeta-
ble seasonings, plus additional categories designated individually by each 
member state. In both the US and EU, irradiated foods must be labelled. 
Consumer acceptance of food irradiation has been slow. 2
2.1.10 
Choking hazards 
US regulation is more stringent than EU regulation regarding choking hazards 
in food. Food items may contain objects, such as toys, on which people 
may choke, especially young children whose airways are smaller and whose 
teeth and judgment are not fully developed (Tarkan 2010). For example, 
Kinder Surprise Eggs have a chocolate coating that covers a plastic capsule 
which contains a toy. In January 2016, a three-year-old French girl choked 
to death on the contents of a Kinder Surprise Egg, and in earlier years at 
least three children in the UK have similarly choked to death (Horton 2016). 
Kinder Surprise Eggs are widely available and ‘immensely popular among 
small children’ in Europe, but ‘[b]ecause of their choking hazard, the eggs 
are banned in the United States’ (Horton 2016).
United States
US law restricts concealed objects in food, including Kinder Surprise Eggs. 
The US Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) of 1938 bans embed-
ded objects in food unless the FDA determines that the object has nutritive 
or functional value. US FDA adopted Import Alert 34-02 on March 01, 2012 
regarding the plastic eggs inside the chocolate coating of Kinder Surprise 
Eggs that ‘may pose a public health risk as the consumer may unknow-
ingly choke on the object.’ The FDA banned Kinder Eggs from US import 
or domestic sale because of this hazard and created a Red List of similar 
products that are subject to Detention without Physical Examination (DWPE) 
at US ports. The Import Alert has been updated as of March 10, 2016, while 
a petition has been submitted to allow the candy in the US, currently to no 
avail (Mitchell 2013).
European Union
Europe regulates toys within food and only bans those that require consump-
tion to get direct access to the toy. The European Commission Enterprise and 
Industry Directorate-General Toy Safety Directive 2009/48/EC set guidelines 
for toys in food, but allowed compliant products to circulate freely throughout 
EU member states (European Commission 2013). After the deaths of three 
children in the UK from choking on the contents of Kinder Surprise Eggs, 
around the year 2000, the UK government considered but did not adopt 
restrictions on such toys concealed in food (Horton 2016).
2 For summaries of current policies, see US FDA (June 28, 2016), fda.gov/Food/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm261680.htm, EU 
(December 16, 2016), ec.europa.eu/food/safety/biosafety/irradiation_en, UK FSA (April 26, 2012), food.gov.uk/science/irradfoodqa, 
and IFST (June 2015), ifst.org/knowledge-centre/information-statements/food-irradiation.
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2.2 Automobile safety standards
The comparative safety of motor vehicles in Europe and the United States 
is a topic of growing importance, in part because global automakers are 
seeking to offer the same (or similar) products to consumers throughout the 
world (Freund and Oliver, 2015; Center for Automotive Research, 2016). The 
globalisation of automotive production can make vehicles more affordable 
to consumers while also providing consumers more choice of vehicle de-
signs (e.g., some German designs have already become quite popular in the 
United States and automakers based in Europe are seeking to offer more 
products in the large American market). A study by the Center for Automo-
tive Research (2016) finds that differing US and EU regulatory standards for 
automobile safety yield extra costs of about US $3 to $4 billion per year for 
the industry as a whole, and several hundred dollars higher incremental costs 
per vehicle for consumers. We explore here why vehicle safety regulations in 
Europe and the US are different, why it is difficult to make a technical case 
that European vehicles are safer than American vehicles (or vice versa), and 
why the emergence of automated and autonomous vehicles provides a new 
opportunity for US-EU regulatory cooperation. 
2.2.1 
Vehicle safety regulation 
The auto safety regulatory processes in North America and Europe began 
to diverge in the 1950s and 1960s. Spurred by the advocacy of Ralph Nader 
and the nascent consumer movement, the US Congress in 1966 established 
a new federal regulatory agency – now called the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) – to set minimum safety standards for all 
new cars sold in the US (Graham, 1989). As a result, dozens of new Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs) have been established governing 
vehicular features such as headlights, brake lights, safety belts, airbags, 
tires, bumpers, and fuel-tank safety. The Canadian government established 
a regulatory process that is largely harmonised with the US process. From 
the industry’s perspective, the North American vehicle market is subject to 
roughly one set of safety standards (Canis and Lattanzio, 2014; Center for 
Automotive Research, 2016: 22). 
Prior to the establishment of the European Union, most European countries 
signed on to an international standard-setting process organised under the 
auspices of the United Nations (UN). The UN Economic Commission for Eu-
rope (UNECE) is now the forum for establishing auto safety standards that are 
recognised throughout the European Union, yielding harmonized automobile 
safety standards across Europe (Center for Automotive Research, 2016: 22). 
With the exception of the US and Canada, most countries in the world are 
either signatories to UNECE standards or accept them as an alternative to 
their own standards (through some form of recognition process). 
At various times over the last 50 years, efforts have been made to harmonise 
NHTSA and UNECE regulations but success has been slow and piecemeal. 
One study examined 43 auto-safety regulations in the US and Europe that 
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have shared safety objectives. They found that only 11 were equivalent; 14 
require major changes in the design of vehicles sold on the two sides of the 
Atlantic; the remaining 18 exhibit more minor differences. Asian regulations 
are typically closer to the EU regulations than to the US regulations (Asso-
ciated Press, 2008). 
2.2.2 
Compliance testing and enforcement for autos
Even when the goals of safety standards are identical, there may be differenc-
es in how compliance with performance standards is measured and enforced 
(Canis and Lattanzio, 2014). For example, to demonstrate compliance with 
frontal-crash protection standards, NHTSA requires automakers to use a 
fixed barrier that absorbs no energy, as might occur when a passenger car 
collides with a heavy truck or an impenetrable bridge abutment while Europe 
requires automakers to use a deformable barrier that simulates the energy 
absorption of another car’s bumper and frontal structure. When automakers 
design vehicles to survive crashes with a fixed versus deformable barrier, 
there are potential ramifications for the frontal structure of the vehicle, optimal 
materials use, steering wheel design, and occupant-protection systems such 
as safety belts and airbags. 
Other facets of compliance tests and consumer information tests have also 
been a source of cross-Atlantic disagreements. Despite many years of dis-
cussions, US and European regulatory officials have not been able to agree 
on how a crash dummy is designed (from a biomechanics perspective), how 
the crash dummy should be seated in a test vehicle, or whether a compliance 
test should be conducted with an unbelted or belted crash dummy (Muscat, 
2013). As a result, basic safety features such as safety belts and airbags 
are designed somewhat differently for vehicles sold in the US and Europe 
(Associated Press, 2008). 
The enforcement processes in the US and Europe also differ (Canis and Lat-
tanzio, 2014). Automakers and suppliers in the US typically self-certify their 
vehicles and components, affirming that they comply with FMVSSs. NHTSA 
has the power to recall vehicles that are defective, and the US product liability 
system is designed to punish car makers that do not design and certify their 
vehicles with the safety of consumers in mind. In Europe, safety regulators 
typically employ a type-approval approach that requires manufacturers to 
demonstrate to regulators that each vehicle model complies with standards, 
before the model is allowed to be sold (Boston Consulting Group, 2015). 
Risks from product liability lawsuits are lower in Europe than the US, since 
Europe relies more on its regulatory system.
Nor should it be assumed that regulatory standards are the only or critical 
drivers of motor vehicle safety in the US and Europe. Over the last 30 years, 
more sophisticated consumer information systems have been developed that 
provide vehicle purchasers useful information about the safety characteristics 
and performance of alternative models. In the United States, the Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety (financed by private insurers) and the non-profit 
organisation Consumer’s Union (again privately funded) provide at least 
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as much safety information to consumers as does the US government. In 
Europe, the development of privately-sponsored consumer safety systems 
is less advanced than it is in the United States but public authorities in the 
EU do provide consumers with substantial information about the safety of 
alternative models.
 2.2.3 
Future regulation of automated and autonomous vehicles
Looking to the future, the regulation of automated and fully autonomous ve-
hicles is a new area where regulators could strive for enhanced coordination, 
since most regulations in the EU and the US are still in development. The 
field is evolving quickly because the technology is improving rapidly, with 
companies taking different approaches to innovation. 
For example, Google is collaborating with Fiat Chrysler Automobiles to cre-
ate a fleet of 100 2017 Chrysler Pacifica minivans. The vehicles will couple 
a hybrid powertrain with autonomous vehicle technology. FCA engineers 
will refine the Pacifica designs to accommodate the array of onboard radar, 
laser-radar, and cameras that allow vehicles to drive themselves. Google test 
cars have already logged 1.5 million miles with only one at-fault accident 
(della Cava, 2016). 
European regulation of autonomous vehicles is affected by the Vienna Con-
vention on Road Traffic of 1968, a treaty ratified by 73 countries worldwide. 
Most European countries have ratified the convention (the United Kingdom 
is an exception) but the United States is not a party to the Convention, as the 
50 states are responsible for developing their own traffic laws (e.g., speed 
limits, alcohol-related laws, and limitations on use of cell phones while driving) 
under discretionary federal guidance. The Vienna Convention was amended 
with effect from March 2016, to allow automated driving technologies trans-
ferring driving tasks to the vehicle, provided that these technologies are in 
conformity with the United Nations vehicle regulations or can be overridden 
or switched off by the driver.
The State of California has also proposed some standards that might require a 
specially licensed driver to be present in the vehicle at all times (Nelson, 2016). 
Google has objected to the California proposal because their self-driving car 
has no steering wheel and pedals and some ride-sharing schemes that are 
being developed by innovators do not envision a driver being present in the 
vehicle. To hedge its bets, Google is looking to do testing of its self-driving 
car in Texas and Massachusetts, where the standards may be more permis-
sive (Nelson, 2016). 
NHTSA developed some guidelines in 2013 that envision five different levels 
of automation, including the possibility of a driverless vehicle. NHTSA has 
publicly signalled to Google and other innovators that it seems possible to 
devise safety standards that would permit a fully driverless vehicle (NHTSA, 
2013; Nelson, 2016). NHTSA held a public hearing on these issues in April 
2016 and plans to issue more detailed guidelines by the end of 2016. 
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 2.2.4 
Comparing traffic safety
The World Health Organization reports traffic fatality rates per 100,000 population 
for countries throughout the world. In 2014 the overall rate for the European 
Union was 5.1 per 100,000 (a figure that includes pedestrians and cyclists as 
well as occupants of vehicles). The comparable figure in the United States is 
10.6 per 100,000 population (WHO, 2014; European Commission, 2015e). 
Does this comparison mean that European cars are safer than US cars? No. 
For starters, the average American drives almost twice as many miles per 
year as the average resident of Germany, France, the UK, and Italy (EU-wide 
mileage data are not reported) (LSECities, 2015). Moreover, there is at least 
as much variability in traffic fatality rates among the 28 EU member states 
and among the 50 US states as there is between the EU and the US. The 
traffic fatality rate in the Czech Republic is far larger than it is in the Neth-
erlands; the rate in Mississippi is far larger than in Massachusetts. Traffic 
safety experts believe that some of the key sources of variability relate to 
driver and roadway characteristics: the number of male drivers on the road 
who are under the age of 25, the average speed of vehicles on the road, the 
blood alcohol concentrations of drivers, and the rates of use of safety belts, 
helmets and child restraint systems. 
It is not obvious whether US or European vehicles deliver superior overall 
levels of safety. Consumers in Europe and the US have somewhat different 
tastes in vehicle size and type: European consumers tend to prefer smaller 
vehicles, though often with high levels of performance (i.e., horsepower and 
torque). American consumers tend to prefer vehicles with more interior volume 
and seating positions, in part because the average American household is 
larger than the average European household. Moreover, Americans also pur-
chase a larger share of pickup trucks and sport-utility vehicles than Europeans 
do, though the market for SUVs in Europe is growing rapidly. The long-term 
trend is toward more similarity between European and American vehicles, 
as global automakers seek to improve efficiency and vehicle affordability by 
making use of one global platform for vehicles sold in numerous countries. 
The US government has made larger investments in traffic safety data systems 
than have the European Union and many EU member states. The US has 
national data systems on the number of vehicle collisions, the number of col-
lisions resulting in driver or passenger injury, and the number of fatalities. The 
US systems also supply data of uniform quality in the 50 states on numerous 
features of the vehicle, the occupants, and the roadway. Based on these data, 
it has been demonstrated that the safety of vehicles in the US – considering 
both probability of collision and survivability of collisions – has steadily im-
proved over the last 10-20 years (NHTSA, 2012; NHTSA, 2013, IIHS, 2015). 
Less is known about trends in vehicle safety throughout the EU because 
the data systems are not of comparable uniformity and quality. However, a 
recent study (Flannagan et al. 2015) did seek to make use of the best avail-
able European and US data for comparative purposes. The authors came 
to a complex set of conclusions, with no clear answer as to the overall level 
of safety of European and US vehicles.
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Specifically, cars designed to meet European safety standards appeared to 
have a lower risk of serious injury in frontal and side crashes and reduced 
frequencies of lane-changing crashes (presumably due to the special EU 
requirements for driver-side mirrors). But, cars designed to meet US stand-
ards appeared to have lower frequencies of injuries in rollover crashes and 
fewer injurious collisions with pedestrians (perhaps due to headlamps that 
make pedestrians more conspicuous). The study concluded that more study 
of different vehicle features and crash modes are required to reach confident 
conclusions about the real-world safety impacts of the differences between 
European and American standards (Flannagan et al. 2015).
2.2.5 
Automobile emissions
In addition to differing standards for automobile safety, the US and EU also 
have differing standards for automobile emissions. US regulations limiting 
automobile emissions of major air pollutants such as lead (Pb), particulate 
matter (PM), sulfur oxides (SOx) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) have been more 
stringent than EU regulations (Walsh 2011). The US phased out lead in auto-
mobile fuel about a decade before Western Europe (and even longer before 
Eastern Europe). US restrictions on NOx and on PM (especially PM2.5), 
both by the federal EPA and by the state of California, have steadily reduced 
ambient NOx and PM2.5 levels in the US and have stringently limited the 
market share of diesel engines in passenger vehicles in the US (Walsh 2011; 
Klier and Linn 2016) (diesel engines emit higher quantities of NOx and PM 
than do gasoline/petrol engines). While the market share of diesel passenger 
vehicles in the US is less than 3 percent, in the EU it has risen from 14 percent 
in 1990 to 52 percent in 2015 (Klier and Linn 2016: 4). 
Further, monitoring and enforcement to ensure compliance with these stand-
ards have been more stringent in the US than in the EU, as evidenced in the 
recent controversies over Volkswagen and perhaps other vehicle manufactur-
ers attempting to evade US emissions tests, and in a growing gap between lab 
test vs. real-world emissions especially in Europe (Klier and Linn 2016: 6-7).
More generally, the current regulatory standard for the annual average concen-
tration of PM2.5 in ambient air quality is 12 µg/m3 in the US, and 25 µg/m3 in 
the EU (i.e. about twice as high in the EU). Beyond this difference in regulatory 
standards for ambient air is the question of actual concentrations: a new World 
Health Organization (WHO) study finds that more than 80 percent of the US is 
below the WHO’s even more stringent air quality goal of 10 µg/m3 for PM2.5, 
whereas more than 60 percent of the EU exceeds that WHO standard (WHO 
2016: Figure 5). “About 60 percent of European cities exceeded WHO limits, 
compared with 20 percent in North America. That difference is probably the 
result of many more diesel-powered vehicles in Europe” (Bajaj 2016).
‘The United States primarily has done an excellent job, moving from being 
a very dirty place in the 1950s to quite a clean place today,’ said Dr. Carlos 
Dora, the [WHO’s] coordinator for its department of public health, environ-
mental and social determinants of health. Europe, he added, ‘has also moved 
from being extremely polluted,’ but it has lagged — a delay that experts have 
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speculated may result from factors that include wider use of fertiliser in urban 
areas, weaker environmental regulations and the popularity of diesel-powered 
engines’ (Goode 2016).
The mortality risk associated with PM2.5 levels is accordingly significantly 
higher in Europe than in the US, although it is even higher in more polluted 
areas such as China and India (WHO 2016; Lelieveld et al. 2015). 
On the other hand, EU regulations and fuel taxes have been more protective 
than US policies in reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from automobiles 
(Klier and Linn 2016: 4-5). The difference in US and EU regulatory standards 
for diesel vehicles and emissions may reflect simultaneous precaution against 
two conflicting sets of risks: greater US precaution against the public health 
risks of Pb, PM, SOx and NOx, vs. greater EU precaution against the risk of 
climate change from CO2 (Walsh 2011).
2.3 Chemical regulation 
Chemical substances are produced and used every day by billions of people all 
over the world. Chemicals are substances, which have the potential to damage 
humans, and the environment. Most substances have undergone only a partial 
or no health risk assessment at all (Abelkop et al. 2016: 13-16, 261-62, Spieker 
2003:3, NAP 1984:12 f., Applegate 1991: 262). To protect people and the envi-
ronment against such unknown impacts, the United States and the European 
Union have each established a framework for chemical risk regulation. In 
both parts of the world, these regulations follow the approach to identify toxic 
substances, and guided by risk assessment (based mainly on dose-response 
relationships and exposure assessments) chemicals are regulated ranging from 
labelling, risk reduction measures to banning them from the market.
Therefore, it is important to know which substances have the potential to 
cause negative health impacts or environmental damages. Furthermore, 
it is important to know the dose-response functions between agents and 
outcomes and to understand the exposure of target populations to the sub-
stance in question. The government requires data on hazards (potential for 
harm), exposure (who is and could be affected in what concentrations?) 
and dose-response relationships (what impact can we expect from what 
concentration of substance?) All this information is crucial to assess risks to 
human health and the environment (Spieker 2003: 3). Often, sufficient data 
for conducting a risk assessment is missing or associated with uncertainties. 
In this case, information about hazards (such as toxic potential, flammability, 
etc.) may act as substitutes for missing risk data.
In addition to dose-response and exposure, the targets of risk assessments 
are also a point of debate: Do regulators test the final product in which such 
substances are embedded or do they test the chemical in isolation? This 
is particularly a problem for products containing nanomaterials or for food 
products containing potentially carcinogenic substances along with antiox-
idants that may mitigate this effect (for example, acrylamide in potatoes).
32 //  Transatlantic patterns of risk regulation
Another point of debate is the combination effect of several chemicals or chem-
icals from several sources. Their health effects may be additive, synergistic or 
antagonistic (Streffer et al. 2003). If chemicals compete for the same receptors 
in the target organ, their health effects tend to be antagonistic (offsetting). If 
they align to different receptors they may be additive or even superadditive 
(synergistic). If low exposure to one chemical interacts with a high exposure 
to another chemical (for example, smoking in combination with air pollution) 
synergistic effects are more likely to occur. Therefore, risk assessments need to 
consider cumulative and combined effects of chemicals on human health and 
the environment (Asmuth et al. 2010, Asmuth and Hilden 2007:71). This is not 
easy to accomplish as human beings are exposed to thousands of chemicals 
at the same time. Assuming additive relationships in cases of uncertainty about 
combined effects is usually done in regulatory decision-making in order to be 
on the safe side in the majority of cases (Streffer et al. 2003). There are hardly 
any differences between the US and EU in this principal approach in spite of 
differences in applying the precautionary principle (which might be interpreted 
as demanding for synergistic effects as a means of ultimate precaution).
Additionally, residues of chemicals like, for example, Glyphosate, can accu-
mulate in food, water and the environment and can pose long-term risks. An 
integrated risk assessment includes such bioaccumulation and persistence 
(Abelkop et al. 2016). However, the data are often ambiguous and long-term 
studies over long time periods are missing. At present, there is heated debate 
in Europe about the regulatory requirements with respect to Glyphosate. 
Although yearly exposure is below the threshold of what is considered tol-
erable, concentrations may accumulate over many years as the toxic effects 
decrease only marginally over time. Similar debates are also present in the 
US but with less potential for conflict and political outrage.
2.3.1 
Chemical regulation in the United States
Chemical regulation in the United States has a long-standing history going 
back to 1976, the year the American Congress passed the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA), 15 USC. §§2601-2692. The Congress authorised the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement the Act (15 US Code 
§ 2601). But it took 40 years to upgrade the TSCA act. In June 2016 the new 
Lautenberg Act was signed into law.
The original TSCA act from 1976
To protect human health and the environment, the TSCA act emphasised that 
regulation of ‘chemical substances and mixtures should be exercised in such 
a manner as not to impede unduly or create unnecessary economic barriers 
to technological innovation... (15 US Code § 2601)’. Therefore, the EPA must 
consider three important policy goals, which were difficult to reconcile (GAO 
2007: 10, Spieker 2003: 11):
• The chemical effects on human health and the environment
• The benefits of use and the availability of substitutes
• The effects on the economy and innovation.
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The EPA regulated the entire life cycle of substances (GAO 2007:11); under 
TSCA it had the authority to ban or restrict the production, distribution or the 
disposal of chemicals if it saw an ‘unreasonable risk’ for environment and 
humans (15 US Code § 2605). The objective was not to eliminate risk, but 
to weigh the risk against social, economic and environmental benefits (Kuhn 
2010: 11) and make reasonable trade-offs between risk, cost and benefit.
All chemical substances imported or produced in the US need to be listed 
in the Chemical Substance Inventory. This inventory included about 62 000 
‘existing substances’ produced and traded before 1979 (GAO 2007: 11). 
Those have been long on the market. They were considered as safe or with 
tolerable effect on environment and humans, if used as regulated. The control 
of newly developed substances was, however, limited and many risk assess-
ments were either incomplete or missing (Spieker 2003: 68). 
During the last decades, the EPA has reviewed about 45 000 ‘new sub-
stances’, among which 20 000 were added to the inventory (GAO 2007: 11). 
When a company intended to produce a chemical substance it has to give 
a pre-manufacture notice (PMN) 90 days before production starts (Kuhn 
2010:13). During the 90 days period, the EPA is authorised to collect and 
review the information, calculate the dose-effect functions and exposure 
levels, and assess the potential risk. Any company intending to produce a 
chemical has been obliged to provide only the data that are available. It was 
not obliged to conduct any new test series (Kuhn 2010: 14). This changed 
with the 2016 Lauterberg Act.
In the past, EPA faced the challenge to decide on the basis of limited in-
formation on the tolerability of the risk posed by the chemical. EPA could 
only ask the companies for existing data to evaluate, but could not require 
additional tests to produce new data unless they had clear evidence that a 
high risk could be expected (Sneed 2016). The EPA was legally not obliged 
to quantify the risks, but needed to take regulatory decisions on the basis 
of scientific evidence. This made regulatory actions difficult to defend if 
quantitative assessments were missing. Therefore, the EPA was active to 
develop their own database about toxicity and carcinogenicity as well as 
exposure to humans and environment (Applegate 1991: 290; Abelkop et al. 
2016). The main problem for the EPA was defending their risk assessment 
in this process with high uncertainty, limited access to data and ambiguity 
in defining a plausible trade-off between risk and benefit. 
EPA has been driven by the following principles when conducting its assess-
ments (Applegate 1991: 271):
• ‘Regulation of risk instead of actual harm’
• ‘A regulatory goal of acceptable risk rather than complete safety’
• ‘Facilitation of cost-risk-benefit balancing’
• ‘Implementation through case-by-case determinations’
If EPA saw an ‘unreasonable risk’, it could demand additional testing of the 
substance (test rule) and could ban or restrict the production or distribu-
tion (15 US Code § 2605). EPA has banned or restricted the use of special 
chemicals in the last decades in less than 5% of cases (Spieker 2003: 12). 
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Since the enactment of TSCA a total of nine substances ´have been banned 
between until 2016. The chemical regulation process did not pose a serious 
burden on the industry and allows effective and quick innovation cycles with 
low costs for the registration and risk assessment process (Spieker 2003: 
12, Sneed 2016). 
In addition, within the TSCA, a more detailed dossier evaluation for substanc-
es, which involved exposure in high doses to humans and the environment, 
could be demanded (High Production Volume testing program). Substances 
of high concern, for example carcinogenic, mutagenic and toxic substances, 
were part of the Toxic Release Inventory and were required to be registered 
and authorised. For a more comprehensive evaluation of the TSCA and for 
suggestions for how it might be improved, see United States Government 
Accountability Office (2005); Abelkop et al. 2016. Not all chemical substanc-
es were included in the TSCA, particularly (15 US Code § 2602): mixture, 
pesticides, tobacco products, nuclear material, food, food additives, drugs, 
and cosmetics were excluded and regulated under other laws such as the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), and the Federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA), a.o. (GAO 2007: 10).
The regulation by the EPA under the TSCA, 15 USC. §§2601-2692 was only 
one part of the chemical regulation in the US. In addition, there are federal 
regulatory requirements for transportation, handling, environmental release 
and clean-up (RCRA and CERCLA/Superfund), information disclosure (Tox-
ics Release Inventory, TRI), as well as separate regulatory requirements for 
special products, such as pesticides (FIFRA), drugs (FFDCA) and consumer 
products (CPSA). There are also additional regulatory provisions in each of 
the US States. Moreover, chemical companies face the threat of product 
liability lawsuits under civil tort law doctrines. This complexity reflects the 
American philosophy of multiple, overlapping sources of authority, which 
tends to characterise US regulatory law (checks and balances). Several US 
statutes constitute a type of ‘toolbox’ that gives a regulatory agency a variety 
of different tools to manage a particular problem with a substance. 
The upgrade of the TSCA – the Frank Lautenberg chemical safety 
act 2016
The New Jersey Senator Frank Lautenberg who established the Toxic Re-
lease Inventory (TRI) 1986, wanted to revise the TSCA act. After years of 
discussion the Congress passed the amendments of the TSCA - the Frank 
Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act of 2016. It was signed 
into law by President Obama on 22 June 2016 (US Congress 2016). This new 
law, enacted by large bipartisan majorities in Congress and supported by the 
Obama administration, environmental groups, and the chemicals industry, 
upgrades the TSCA in several ways to promote the testing, risk evaluation 
and regulation of existing chemicals similar the European REACH-regulation 
(EDF 2016). The new Lautenberg Act gives EPA now the power to evaluate the 
safety and it plans to review thousands of new, but also existing chemicals 
in the following years (Sneed 2016). EPA started with a list of ten chemicals, 
which were on the market since decades and will review them in the next 
years. It gives EPA more power to ask for data and additional testing (Sneed 
2016). In addition, it adds more power to the regulator to intervene even if 
Transatlantic patterns of risk regulation  // 35
the evidence is not conclusive, thus adding more precautionary elements 
into the US regulatory system. The main amendments of the law are (EDF 
2017, US EPA 2016, 2016a): 
• EPA has the mandate to prioritize and evaluate the existing and new 
chemicals on a risk-based safety standard and to make decisions on the 
best available science and on the weight of scientific evidence.
• The Lautenberg act replaces the “least burdensome requirement” from 
EPA to show evidence of potential risk or high exposure. 
• The burden of proof will shift to the companies. They have to pay for costs 
of risk evaluation.
• EPA gets a payment as a source of funding to implement the new law and 
evaluate the risks.
• EPA shall disclose the information about chemicals and make them 
available to local and state government and environmental and health 
professionals to increase the public transparency if chemical information.
• The new law has foreseen data sharing and alternative test methods to 
reduce animal testing.
The new Lautenberg Act is still in process of implementation by EPA and the 
next years will show if it improves chemical safety or adds only bureaucratic 
hurdles to regulation. 
2.3.2 
Chemical regulation in Europe
In June 2007, the new chemical REACH regulation - Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals – became the official regulatory 
framework for all Member States of the European Union. It was the result 
of a long discussion and negotiation process with all member states that 
started almost a decade before the regulatory framework was enacted. In 
1998, the Commission of the European Union identified significant deficits 
in chemical regulation in Europe. As a result, stakeholders from industry, 
research, NGOs, and regulators consulted with the Commission in order to 
establish strategies for chemical policy (Kuhn 2010: 67, Penman 2015: 59). 
Finally, this process led to the publication of the White Paper on a ’Strategy 
for the future EU Chemicals Policy’ in 2001 (Assmuth et al. 2010: 3954, Kuhn 
2010: 67, CEC 2001).
For the first time, a harmonised and uniform system of chemical regulation 
was implemented for all Member States (Kuhn 2010: 97). ‘Applying the pre-
cautionary principle is a key tenet of its policy, and the choices it makes to 
this end will continue to affect the views it defends internationally, on how 
this principle should be applied’ (European Commission, 2000: 3). REACH 
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How intensive these procedural steps are conducted depends mainly on the 
amount of the substance, the magnitude of exposure to humans and the 
environment and on the presumed or proven level of harm (Kuhn 2010: 97). 
In contrast to the EPA and US regulation, REACH demands collection of data 
or risk assessment from the manufacturer and supplier before a substance is 
permitted to be produced and transported. The burden of proof resides with 
the industry (Kuhn 2010: 97, Penman 2015: 62). Similar to the EPA, REACH 
distinguishes between ‘existing’ and ‘new substances’. Existing’ substances 
are those that had been introduced before 1981; ‘new’ chemicals are those 
that have been introduced since 1981.
Any substance produced or imported into the EU that exceeds one ton per 
year must be registered with ECHA, the European Chemical Agency based 
in Helsinki (ECHA 2016a, Penman 2015: 61). If a company manufactures or 
imports a substance in amounts less than one ton a year, it does not need 
to register the substance. If it reaches or exceeds this threshold, the charac-
teristics of the specific substance determines which information is needed 
for registration. This requirement is based on the assumption that exposure 
and potential risk increase with the volume and amount of the substance 
produced.
If a company intends to produce or import a substance, it has to register it with 
ECHA and submit a technical dossier, which contains information about the 
physical, toxic character of the substance and, in quantities of more than 10 
t/year, a Chemical Safety Report (CSR) (ECHA 2016a). The technical dossier 
and the CSR are assessed by ECHA, as well as by national regulation au-
thorities such as the German UBA and BfR (European Parliament, Council of 
the European Union (2006), Art 20. Abs.1). The scope of the dossier depends 
on the amount of the chemical substance produced (European Parliament, 
Council of the European Union (2006), Art. 12). After the data and dossier are 
submitted, ECHA is given three weeks - for phase-in-substances up to three 
months - to decide if the information provided by the company is complete 
or if further testing is required (European Parliament, Council of the European 
Union (2006), Art. 20, 41, 42).
2.3.3 
Comparison of the regulation approaches
Looking at chemical regulation, both the US and EU still face problems of 
lack of data, high uncertainties of risk assessment, burden of proof, high 
cost of testing and low incentives for substitution of hazardous chemicals 
(Karlsson 2011: 258).
The traditional American TSCA approach to chemical regulation was following 
a ‘risk-based’ approach and the European REACH regulation a ‘precaution-
ary approach ’. TSCA was not pursuing an explicit precautionary principle, 
was less preventive and the proof of harm had to be demonstrated, before 
chemicals could be regulated. It favoured a low level of intervention and did 
not require companies to provide necessary quantitative data for assessing 
risks to human health and the environment. This regulatory style facilitated 
innovation as it placed less of a burden on companies compared to REACH. 
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But according to analysts of regulatory practice, the distinction between risk-
based and precautionary regulation was not as clear-cut as it may seem on 
first glance (Karlsson 2011: 258). First, the actual standards were not much 
different in the US and Europe and the missing company data was partly 
compensated for by the EPA’s own assessment activities (Wiener and Rogers 
2002; Elliott and Renn 2011). Second, in the US, the threat of tort cases had a 
strong effect on companies to monitor its impacts as they might be brought to 
court even if they produced within the permissible standards of EPA’s regula-
tions (Abelkop et al. 2016: 16). In essence, the TSCA provided little incentive 
to collect more chemical data but it was in the interest of chemical producers 
to reduce uncertainties as a means to avoid costly tort cases. Nevertheless, 
there were also voices that characterise the knowledge about chemicals in 
the US as static and not responsive enough to new scientific insights (Spieker 
2003: 17). Critics claimed that learning in risk assessment was very low in 
the US in comparison to the European chemical risk assessment. 
The new Lautenberg Chemical Safety Act strengthened US law regarding 
existing chemicals by introducing clear and enforceable deadlines, new 
testing and risk-based safety standards, and increased public transparency 
for chemical information (US EPA 2016; EDF 2016). 
It must also be noted that REACH is not as precautionary as it sounds (Eu-
ropean Parliament, Council of the European Union (2006), Art. I (3)). Hansen 
et al. 2007 seriously doubt that REACH meets the precautionary promise 
because it includes a rather restrictive understanding of scientific uncertainty, 
follows a distinct separation between risk assessment and risk management 
(thus underestimating risks in the process of production and use), and does 
not provide enough incentives for creating substitutes as a safer alternative 
to the existing chemicals (Godard 2012: 25).
Since the burden of proof and the requirement for collecting data resides with 
the companies, the company has no other choice but to provide the data 
before it can sell the product (European Parliament, Council of the European 
Union (2006), Art. 5., Penman et al. 2015: 62). This approach motivates com-
panies to collect and produce relevant data for gaining deeper knowledge 
about chemical substances and their risks – otherwise they cannot place it 
on the market - and to continuously invest in learning more about the effects 
of chemicals they use or market. Both, REACH and the Lautenberg Chemical 
Safety Act can force the companies to conduct between 22 and 54 tests, 
depending on the quantity, whereas the original TSCA did not require tests for 
existing substances and 14 voluntary tests for new substances with volume 
above 100 t (GAO 2007: 25, Karlsson 2011: 258). 
REACH has restricted over 64 substances, most of which are still allowed in 
the US law (from 1976), 1378 chemicals are banned in the EU for cosmetics 
as compared to 11 in the US, 82 pesticides banned which are still allowed 
for use in the US (Reineke 2016). The EPA has announced that it will demand 
additional testing for new chemicals and chemicals on the market and change 
the regulation significantly. 
Several analysts claim that REACH is lacking effectiveness and is impeding 
innovation (Fleurke and Somsen 2011: 357, Karlsson 2011: 250). The key 
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element of REACH is not to ban a substance but to substitute it with safer 
alternatives or devise other options to contain its negative potential. This can 
also be seen as an incentive for substitution compared to an ‘industry-friendly’ 
approach that places the burden of proof on the potential victims (Fleurke 
and Somsen: 388). Finding alternatives for substances forces the compa-
nies to develop substitutes that meet the REACH standards. If companies 
outside the EU want to export products to the EU, they have to produce 
these substitutes as well and are not allowed to export substances that are 
allowed only in their own country. At the same time, a consumer outside 
of the EU may rather want to purchase the safer substitutes than the origi-
nal substance, which is not registered in the EU. Since the implementation 
of REACH the sales of chemicals have increased and the EU is today the 
leading importer and exporter of chemicals (Silbergeld et al. 2015: 186). 
The European Commission has come to the conclusion that the monetised 
health benefit of REACH exceeds by far the costs of implementing REACH 
(Silbergeld et al. 2015: 186). If EPA will implement the Lautenberg Chemical 
Safety Act in due time, risk assessment approaches of REACH and TSCA 
will be more aligned. Chemicals, which still allowed on the US market and 
forbidden in Europe, for example as Atrazine or formaldehyde in cosmetics 
will probably be evaluated and regulated by EPA in the next years. A new 
regulation systems will be created, perhaps as or even more effective then 
REACH with less regulative effort.
2.3.4 
Transatlantic cooperation and its impacts
Transatlantic regulatory cooperation, such as through cooperation among 
regulators or the attempted negotiations of regional trade agreement, seek-
ing to expand trade and increase economic growth, have at times been 
criticised as a step backward in consumer and environmental protection 
by many environmental groups. Concerns include that substances that are 
permitted in one country could have to be permitted in other countries (Raza 
2016: 171). This would undermine the burden of proof policy mandated by 
REACH if such a clause is not adopted in the US. The German chemical in-
dustry claims that they will not accept any lower safety standards than what 
REACH would prescribe (VCI 2016). Transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
could nonetheless involve a closer collaboration between the regulatory 
agencies in the US and Europe.
The effort to harmonise and align the different EU and US standards in regu-
lations may be elusive. While it is true that most standards do not differ much 
in substance, the processes to arrive at these standards are not identical. In 
addition, there are fewer standards in the US than in the EU as the US sys-
tem relies more on civil liability law and less on administrative law (Abelkop 
et al. 2016: 16). The US framework lacks standardisation in many areas in 
which the EU law prescribes standards or technical procedures. “A mutual 
recognition of standards” (Pelkmans 2015: 46) as proposed by the US might 
soften the high-safety standards of the EU framework if the US standards are 
taken as the starting point. At the same time, if all the European standards 
were adopted in the US, many chemical operations would need to engage in 
multiple changes. One solution is to accept the different density of standards 
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in both countries and demand mutual recognition of each system’s regulatory 
provisions. The more that standards are already identical or closely similar, 
the more that harmonisation (also of procedures and processes to reach 
these standards) would be useful and acceptable to both parties. The mutual 
recognition of rules, which exists in the European market, especially in the 
case of chemicals, will pose a high challenge. Neither reducing the safety 
standard to the lowest common denominator nor always taking the strictest 
available standard is likely to be an acceptable solution.
So what could cooperation in chemical regulation look like? One option is 
to exclude the chemical regulation of REACH from trade agreements so 
that both parties need to respect the rules of the other party. The European 
Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC), however, has sought to develop a better 
EU-US-framework by “aligning the classification and labelling” (Cefic 2016). 
This would “provide users a clearer product information”, “making the risk 
assessment more efficient and effective”, and “reduce compliance costs for 
industry” (Cefic 2016). Another option that we deem appropriate is to seek 
harmonisation where both systems reach almost the same conclusion (re-
gardless of the pathway by which this conclusion has been reached) and to 
leave the remaining standards untouched in both systems. Similarly, Abelkop 
et al. (2016: 256-57) propose, in the near term, informal dialogues on a case 
by case basis among US, European, Canadian and Japanese regulators 
and stakeholders, rather a formal treaty to harmonize chemicals standards 
across the board. Exporting from one system to the other would then entail 
a check whether the product falls into the harmonised or non-harmonised 
section of the chemical products. 
Regardless which solution is chosen, international regulatory cooperation 
could at least improve the transparency and encourage product information 
sharing. This could include: 
• Data sharing, common testing protocols
• Aligned classification and labelling
• Early and transparent cooperation and exchange of scientific information
• Common guidelines for risk evaluation, which should lead to lower 
bureaucratic hurdles and costs in practice, but not to identical outcomes 
in regulatory decisions (Pérez and Dudley 2016).
Already today, data-sharing agreements between companies make testing 
less expensive and time-consuming so that innovative forces can be released 
(Penman 2015: 62). REACH and also Lautenberg allow for more transparency 
on the potential impacts of substances. This includes more opportunities for 
informed public involvement in chemical risk regulation (Fleurke and Somsen 
2001: 386) that they can decide which products the use. 
Both approaches in US and EU distinguish between ‘existing substances’ 
which exist already on the market and the supply chain, and ‘new substances’ 
which the companies intend to produce or import. Existing substances did 
not need to undergo the same amount of testing as new chemicals under the 
TSCA regulations but, as mentioned above, the new Lautenberg Chemical 
Safety Act of 2016 will require testing of existing chemicals (US EPA 2016; 
EDF 2016). The same is true for REACH until 2018. After this date registration 
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and quantitative risk assessments are legally prescribed for existing (now 
called) ‘phase-in substances’ (ECHA 2016b).






Precautionary and risk-based ap-
proach
Chemicals
Distinguish between new and existing 
substances, only new substances are 
regulated until 2018.
Chemicals
Distinguish between new and 
existing substances, only new sub-
stances are regulated. 
Chemicals
Distinguish between new and existing 
substances; both new and existing 
substances are regulated
Burden of proof
The ‘burden of proof’ resides with the 
industry. It has to be able to demon-
strate that the chemical can be used 
safely. All actors in the supply chain 
will be obliged to ensure the safety of 
the chemical substances they handle. 
This will place a high burden on the 
company and lead to higher costs for 
conducting the assessment.
Burden of proof
The ‘burden of collecting data’ was 
on industry. Each company had 
to deliver existing data only. There 
was no requirement of testing, tests 
are voluntary. The burden of proof 
that chemicals pose unreasonable 
risks resided with the EPA. It had to 
choose the “least burdensome “way 
of addressing risk”. Time, effort and 
cost of the company were moderate.
Burden of proof
The burden of proof that chemicals 
pose unreasonable risks still rests 
on EPA. Companies can submit data 
and request EPA for testing, but they 
have to pay for the costs of evalu-
ation. Time, effort and cost of the 
company are probably less intensive 
than for REACH.
Risk evaluation procedure
Registration and risk assessment will 
be required when production/import 
reaches 10 ton. As far as possible, 
animal testing will be minimised. In-
formation on chemical use, exposure 
and toxicity is required.
Risk evaluation procedure
The TSCA does not require compa-
nies to perform risk assessments on 
new chemicals, risk assessment is 
voluntary.
Risk evaluation procedure
Prioritization: Review and determina-
tion of existing chemicals in “low” and 
“high” priorities.
Risk evaluation: Chemicals with 
“high” priorities will require 10 on-go-
ing risk evaluations in the first 180 
days.
Pre market review: affirmative finding 
by EPA for each new chemical before 
it is allowed on the market
Standard
High quality of risk assessment and 
overall high-performance standard in 




standard in protecting humans and 
the environment for those chemicals 
that are regulated under the TSCA. 
Standard
Overall risk-based safety, high per-
formance in protecting humans and 
the environment for those chemicals 
that are regulated. 
Table 1: REACH vs. TSCA vs. 
Lautenberg
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REACH TSCA (before 2016) Lautenberg Act (June 2016)
Innovation
Innovation of safer substances will be 
encouraged under REACH through 
more incentives for research and de-
velopment, lower registration costs for 
new substances, obligation to consid-
er substitute substances for decisions 
on authorisation and restrictions, and 
overall high incentives for learning.
Innovation
Innovation for safer substances is 
not required or encouraged. If no 
substitute is available, the sub-
stance can still be marketed if risk 
is reasonable. Emphasis is on facil-
itating innovation; overall, there are 
fewer incentives for learning.
Innovation
EPA has to conduct a cost-benefit 
and a cost-effectiveness analysis of 
proposed restrictions. It has to de-
scribe the impacts of its restrictions 
on economy. Alternative products 
and their possible risks and costs 
will be considered.
Information transparency
The disclosure of information under 
REACH aims to guide downstream 
users for safe use and handling, pro-
vide information to the public (safety 
sheets), educate a risk-informed so-
ciety, and facilitate data-sharing for 
complex chemical agreement be-
tween industries.
Information transparency
The disclosure of information under 
TSCA is voluntary only, but EPA can 
force the disclosure if they see an 
unreasonable risk. Once disclosed 
information is available to everyone 
(Freedom of Information Act).
Information transparency
The disclosure of information under 
TSCA is voluntary. Once disclosed 
information is available to everyone 
(Freedom of Information Act).
‘REACH is an on-going regulation and there has been a significant devel-
opment in the way it is administered and implemented, as all stakeholders 
gain a greater understanding of the requirements and all of the science / 
processes involved’, (Penman et al. 2015:64). The Lautenberg act is new 
and its impacts will depend on how it is implemented in the coming years. 
2.3.5 
Conclusions
From taking a close look at the risk regulation of chemicals in the United 
States and Europe it can be concluded that the differences between REACH 
and the traditional TSCA Act form 1978 are not so pronounced as it may 
appear at first glance. The underlying assumption that Europe is governed 
by the notion of precaution and the United States solely by evidence based 
on risk assessments is less pronounced in practice than on paper. The new 
Lautenberg Act gives the EPA the power to act more preventive as the REACH 
regulation already is doing and the two systems will probably align in the 
next years. The new Act gives TSCA a similar quality to REACH, but less 
regulatory burdens ( Maerch 2016).
Charnley and Elliott (2002) have also argued convincingly that a simplistic 
opposition between the precautionary principle in Europe and quantitative 
risk-assessment in the US is actually a ‘false dichotomy.’ Even the new 
REACH target of 2018 by the European Union does not substitute risk as-
sessments with a pure ‘better safe than sorry’ attitude. On the contrary, the 
REACH proposal places a strong emphasis on a scientific assessment of 
hazards and risks for both existing and new chemicals and places the burden 
of providing these assessments on industry. The new Lautenberg Chemical 
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Safety Act of 2016, amending TSCA, requires testing of existing as well as 
new chemicals (similar to REACH), and calls on US EPA to conduct risk 
evaluations, set priorities, and regulate (US EPA 2016).
REACH is more concerned with traceability than looking for precautionary 
methods for dealing with uncertainty. Still, it is probably one of the strictest 
preventive chemical regulations worldwide. It had significant effects on other 
countries (Silbergeld et al. 2015: 185). For example, Japan, Turkey, Taiwan 
and South Korea all developed a regulatory framework similar to REACH, 
China adopted a REACH-like regulatory framework in 2010, which forces 
companies to submit a notification of new substances and develop and 
conduct toxicological and ecotoxicological tests (Silbergeld 2015: 185), and 
the Lautenberg Chemical Safety Act updates US regulation in several ways 
similar to REACH. This shows the high impact of REACH on the worldwide 
practice in chemical risk regulation. 
With regard to chemical regulation, there were definitely some elements of 
‘precaution’ in the US system under the traditional TSCA regime. For exam-
ple, the EPA has successfully prevented some new chemicals from entering 
the market, not because they were proven to be hazardous, but because 
there was inadequate evidence proving their safety and because they were 
similar to other chemicals that were known to be hazardous. On the other 
hand, there have also been some notable failures in the US to review previous 
authorisations, principally when a substance was already on the market and 
the burden was on a government agency such as the EPA to build a factual 
case that would stand up in court to ban or regulate the substance (the new 
Lautenberg Chemical Safety Act of 2016 will strengthen EPA’s oversight of 
existing chemicals). But other structural features of the US law-making system 
tend to encourage precautionary action, such as the threat of tort liability and 
the expansive authority of US agencies to interpret existing statutes to deal 
with new problems. Some observers have suggested this broad authority 
to reinterpret statutes enables US regulators to be more ‘agile’ than their 
colleagues in Europe in responding to emerging technologies. This would 
enable US regulators to be more ‘precautionary’ in the sense of regulating 
earlier in some circumstances that would require new legislation in Europe 
(Elliott 2005).
REACH greatly expands the obligations of manufacturers to provide test data 
for certain chemicals, especially existing chemicals that are already on the 
market. This will be even more pronounced after 2018 when all chemicals 
are registered which are on the market. As pointed out above, however, it 
remains to be seen whether requiring more test data will necessarily translate 
into regulatory decisions that are more precautionary. At the same time, the 
practical implication of the traditional TSCA has shown that the standards 
derived from its analyses are not more lenient than those of Europe and that, 
in some instances where tort cases are threatening companies, chemical 
concentrations in products have been even more limited than in Europe. 
Yet there is clearly a tendency in the US to foster innovation while Europe 
prioritises risk aversion and safety over economic potential, but the new 
Lautenberg Act has aligned both systems for more precautionary regulation 
and perhaps we will have a REACH-like system in the US in the next year, 
which might be more effective than REACH in Europe.
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The pharmaceuticals sector provides an archetypical example of proactive 
public sector risk governance under conditions of uncertainty. Unlike or-
dinary consumer products, drugs may not be marketed without advance 
regulatory approval. Effective access to pharmaceuticals is also affected by 
the decisions of payers on whether a drug is eligible for reimbursement, for 
what conditions, and at what prices. 
Licensing decisions are based on projections of safety, efficacy, and manu-
facturing quality, with revisions to the conditions of licenses as safety, efficacy 
or quality issues arise in use. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) and 
US Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) approaches to drug licensing 
are marked by commonalities and differences. Both the EMA and FDA are 
committed to rigorous evaluation of pharmaceuticals in advance of market 
access with feedback from post-market experience. The FDA is augmenting 
traditional licensing procedures with Breakthrough Product Designation. The 
EMA is developing integrated adaptive pathways for licensing, with formal 
pilot tests to provide a practical proof of concept. 
Reimbursement decisions are based on evaluations of effectiveness and in 
some countries on cost-effectiveness. EU reimbursement standards vary 
across member nations, with less intra-European harmonisation on payment 
than on licensing. US reimbursement standards vary across public payers 
including Medicare/Medicaid Services and the Veterans Administration and 
across hundreds of private payers including insurers and Health Mainte-
nance Organizations. The US reimbursement landscape is in flux, with recent 
provisions for FDA-CMS parallel review, the consolidation of private payers 
through mergers and acquisitions, and US payers questioning the pricing 
of monoclonal antibodies such as PCSK9, curatives including nucleotide 
analogs such as sofosbuvir used in combination with other drugs to treat 
hepatitis C virus (HCV) infections, and other new drugs. While the absence 
of centralised reimbursement decisions complicates simple EU-US com-
parisons, several generalisations emerge. Relative to their US counterparts, 
EU payers typically set higher standards for evidence of effectiveness as a 
condition of reimbursement, impose tougher limits on reimbursement by 
indication, and drive harder deals in negotiations over prices. 
This paper provides the historical context for evolving licensing and reim-
bursement policies, describes recent developments in the EU and US, and 
concludes with comparisons of existing differences and a projection of trends. 
3 The views presented in this section of this report are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, the European Medicines Agency, Amgen, the Food and Drug Administration or the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development. The authors of the pharmaceuticals case have not reviewed the report as a whole and neither 
endorse nor dissent from the views expressed in other sections of this report.
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2.4.2 
Context
Existing licensing policies have been shaped, piecemeal, by a series of cri-
sis-prompted reforms in drug licensing within the OECD. In the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, birth defects produced by Thalidomide prompted adop-
tion of more stringent standards for demonstration of efficacy and safety in 
advance of approval and to the strengthening of adverse effects reporting 
systems. In the 1970s and 1980s, the demands of HIV and cancer patients 
for earlier access to live saving medicines prompted the development of 
accelerated approval and conditional marketing authorisation pathways, 
with deferred validation of biomarkers. In the 2000s, adverse effects caused 
by Vioxx® (rofecoxib), Accutane® (isotretinoin) and other drugs prompted 
improvements in aftermarket surveillance programs and to the development 
of FDA Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) and the European 
Risk Management Strategy (ERMS) to manage known risks. Finally, U.S. 
backlogs in licensing were produced, in part, by the challenge of simulta-
neously demonstrating safety and efficacy, providing early access to drugs, 
managing known risks and strengthening after market surveillance. These 
crisis-driven reforms have improved detection of severe adverse effects, 
improved management of identified risks and accelerated patient access to 
drugs for unmet life-threatening medical needs. Current calls for reform in 
licensing follow less from crises than from sustained evolutionary pressures 
on regulators, drug developers, patients, providers and payers. Some ele-
ments are direct extensions of the trends above, while other elements have 
emerged in the past ten years. 
First, patients with unmet medical needs continue to press for earlier ac-
cess to drugs. The highly visible mass protests and sit-ins of HIV activists 
have given way to communications and outreach strategies of the National 
Organization for Rare Disorders and other patient groups. Social media and 
web-based communications have increased the impact of such bottom-up 
organizing. 
Second, subjects with comorbidities and subjects taking other drugs are 
often excluded from clinical trials to enable detection of treatment effects. 
But patients often suffer from more than one ailment, take other drugs, and 
fail to adhere to labels. As a consequence, subjects in conventional trials are 
imperfect surrogates for patients taking drugs in the real world. Confound-
er cleansing of populations of subjects taking drugs in trials increases the 
ability to detect a drug effect if it is there, but decreases external validity. 
Progressive reduction of resulting uncertainties will need to be achieved by 
way of subsequent studies that could range from clinical trials to the use of 
data from observational studies and real world health records. Observational 
studies and real world data should complement, not replace, RCTs. 
Third, within both the United States and Europe, increasing evidentiary de-
mands and rising late stage failures during clinical trials have increased the 
cost of drug development. Drug companies have added effectiveness studies 
to traditional safety and efficacy studies to meet demands from payers for 
evidence-based reimbursement. Marketing requirements, specifically the 
need to support the addition of new drugs to managed care drug formularies, 
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have contributed to a rise in drug development costs. Globalisation of mar-
kets has also led to multi-regional clinical trials and additional data collection 
needs. In the United States, R&D efficiency has been declining steadily, with 
the 2010 cost of bringing a drug to market running at about $US 1.5 billion. 
Within Europe, national payers have varying evidentiary requirements that 
are not coordinated with regulators. The cost of bringing a complex new drug 
to market in the EU now approaches € 1.7 billion, heavily loaded toward the 
cost of trials conducted at the back end of the process. 
Fourth, as the scientific revolution in genetics reshapes medicine, an increas-
ing number of treatments in development now target smaller genetically 
defined subpopulations instead of larger heterogeneous populations. This 
splintering of disease populations and narrowing of labelled indications is 
improving the effectiveness of medicine. It is also increasing the difficulty of 
recruiting adequate numbers of subjects for the clinical trials that provide an 
evidentiary basis for projecting the safety and efficacy of drugs. Drugs serv-
ing small numbers of patients are priced high. The splintering of indications 
has also created smaller market niches that are often filled by only one drug 
rather than two or more competing drugs, weakening or eliminating market 
pressures to ease pricing. Smaller market niches affect the size of the base 
from which sponsors may recover costs, as development and testing ex-
penses are spread across fewer patients. Taken together, these evolutionary 
changes have simultaneously increased drug development costs and raised 
drug prices. 
These developments define a complex setting for benefit-risk management 
in pharmaceuticals. Risk management in medicine now entails engaging 
with risks associated with medical and other health products, risks to public 
budgets from the adoption and coverage of new therapeutics, and risks to 
patient privacy from novel uses of medical data. The traditional focus on 
benefit-risk in the context of evidence generation on safety and efficacy for 
licensing must now be broadened to include a second focus on benefit in 
the context of evidence generation on the effectiveness for treatment and 
reimbursement. Faced with rising costs for pharmaceuticals and increasing 
political pressure to contain costs, patients, physicians and payers are de-
manding better information on the effectiveness of drugs.4 Although beyond 
the purview of traditional pharmaceuticals regulatory agencies such as the 
EMA and FDA, the acquisition, analysis and interpretation of evidence on 
the effectiveness of drugs in use will be an increasingly significant element 
of health care policy. 
2.4.3 
Current developments in Europe
Under traditional approaches to drug licensing, drug companies rely on 
models, in vitro studies and animal studies and randomised clinical trials 
using populations of subjects free of confounding factors to demonstrate 
the safety and superior efficacy of a drug. Under traditional licensing sys-
4 One effort to cooperate on pharmaceutical product quality assessment is the International Council for Harmonisation of Technical 
Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH). See Parker and Eisner (2016).
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tems, there is a ‘magic moment’ when a drug is either approved or rejected. 
Carefully monitored subjects become lightly observed patients, experimental 
therapeutics become accepted treatments, and drugs are transformed from 
unproven to safe and effective. 
In the European Union, this traditional binary model of drug approval, de-
scribed by the left diagram in Figure 1, is now changing rapidly toward 
explicitly adaptive approaches to licensing with patient experience contribut-
ing to evidence development. The diagram on the right describes an adaptive 
approach to licensing. At the front end, approval would come earlier, would 
be limited to patients with the most favourable priors benefit/risk and would 
be conditional. At the back end, observations of patient experience would 
be strengthened through greater reliance on registry and electronic health 
records, with a systematic analysis of that experience to evaluate safety and 
effectiveness, and with modification of labels and the terms and conditions 
of licensing based on patient experience. Conditions now favour implemen-
tation of adaptive approaches to risk governance, with both demands for 
more adaptive approaches to licensing and factors enabling implementation 
of adaptive approaches strengthening. These points are developed more 
fully in Eichler et al.(2015).
The EU turn toward adaptive pathways has been enabled by dramatic im-
provements in post-licensing identification of adverse drug effects. In the 
1950s and 1960s, thalidomide use in pregnancy caused phocomelia, a highly 
visible adverse effect with a low background incidence. It took around 10.000 
cases before healthcare professionals made the connection between thalid-
omide use and phocomelia. Contrast this tragically slow learning with recent 
rapid detection of adverse effects. Adverse effects of Tysabri® (natalizumab 
for multiple sclerosis) were detected after only three cases of Progressive 
multifocal leukoencephalopathy (PML) were reported. Adverse effects of 
H1N1 pandemic flu vaccine Pandemrix® were investigated after the Swedish 
Medicines Agency received only six reports of narcolepsy following vacci-
nation. Yet our ability to detect adverse drug reactions with small risk ratios 
on high-background events is limited within both conventional and adaptive 
licensing frameworks. In both contexts, it is essential that all parties improve 
adherence to after-market commitments to monitor for safety, efficacy and 
effectiveness. 
Figure 1: Traditional and Adaptive 
Licensing. Source: authors
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EU reliance on adaptive pathways is also enabled by targeted prescribing. 
When a drug is initially intended for use by a well-defined subset of pa-
tients, wide-spread use by patients outside of the target group might open 
the door to negative patient outcomes. Regulators have some limited tools 
to steer drug utilisation by way of controlled access programs, prescriber 
restrictions, educational requirements, and clinical reminder systems. In 
practice, payers, healthcare systems providers and professional societies, 
rather than regulators, are the stewards of appropriate prescribing. As new 
premium priced drugs enter the market, payer interests in effectiveness 
and cost-containment are leading to increasingly regimented use through 
pre-reimbursement requirements, prescribing audits, prescriber restrictions, 
tiered co-payments and mandatory treatment protocols. Regulator and payer 
actions in cooperation with the bodies that produce clinical practice guidelines 
are likely to improve prescription controls, particularly for diseases that are 
treated in specialist centres. 
Finally, EU reimbursement policies are of increasing importance in risk 
management. Only a small and shrinking fraction of expensive new drug 
treatments are paid out-of-pocket by patients. Decisions by third party pay-
ers on whether and how to reimburse are gaining increasing importance to 
both patients and marketing authorisation holders. Regulatory approval is a 
necessary but not sufficient pre-condition for effective patient access. There 
is growing awareness among many payers that they, like the regulators, 
cannot escape the acrimonious debate over access versus evidence. Payers 
recognise that the distinction between experimental versus medically neces-
sary is based on a simplified view of evidence and uncertainty, with explicit 
recognition of the evolving strength of evidence. Many payers are shifting 
from seeing decisions on reimbursement as a one-time binary decision, to 
seeing reimbursement decisions as an on-going process aiming at providing 
greater certainty about value for money as evidence accumulates. Once a 
coverage decision has been made, payers have an interest in limiting initial 
use to subpopulations with the best benefit-risk ratios, in improving patient 
adherence, in monitoring treatment outcomes and in modifying conditions 
of reimbursement in light of evidence on effectiveness.
Some of these issues may be partially addressed through harmonised 
adoption of adaptive approaches to drug development, licensing and reim-
bursement. Industry is moving from blockbuster to niche buster business 
models, even as payers increase evidence requirements for reimbursement 
and regulators seek to revise licensing terms in light of evolving evidence from 
use. While regulators have achieved some degree of interregional harmonisa-
tion of evidence standards, payers are at an earlier point in that dialog. The 
lack of alignment results in differences in standards for drug development 
and reimbursement. How will adaptive pathways help? Because adaptive 
licensing requires early engagement with all stakeholders, an adaptive ap-
proach to licensing should catalyse consensus building among payer both 
within and across regions. In fact, the Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI) in 
the EU is now working to create a framework for implementation of ‘Medicines 
Adaptive Pathways for Patients’ (MAPPs).
48 //  Transatlantic patterns of risk regulation
2.4.4 
Current development in the US
The US FDA frames risk management decisions across the life cycle of a 
drug in terms of a benefit-risk framework with emphasis on transparency and 
continuous learning. Recent FDA initiatives include Patient-Focused Drug 
Development and FDA Breakthrough Product Designation early in the drug 
life cycle, the use of pharmaceutical quality metrics in manufacturing of ge-
nerics late in the drug life cycle to cover off patent drugs 80 percent of which 
are generic, and the use of benefit-risk analysis throughout the life cycle.
The FDA uses a formalised benefit-risk assessment approach to structure and 
manage new drug assessment. While the idea of using benefit-risk assess-
ment is not unique to FDA, the way that benefit-risk assessment is conducted 
by the FDA takes account of emerging information on medicine, science 
and policy with sensitivity to emerging knowledge in a manner analogous to 
U.S. case law. The law and regulations concerning the drug review process 
generally provide broad principles and are not case-specific, so FDA works 
to develop consistent policy in taking action within its legal and regulatory 
authority, to make decisions in a way that is fair, not arbitrary or capricious. 
FDA communicates this policy through guidance. However, in a given case 
it may determine that generally applicable guidance is inappropriate, and 
in such cases retains the flexibility to take a different approach. Since each 
decision is made either in the context of established policy or establishes 
new policy, this serves FDA as a sort of ‘case law’. Although the quantity 
of information to be evaluated and considered by FDA is substantial, there 
are residual uncertainties resulting, for example, from the gaps in the data 
or current scientific understanding, and human judgment and values must 
come into play. The framework for benefit-risk decision-making summaris-
es the relevant facts, uncertainties, and key areas of judgment, and clearly 
explains how these factors influence a regulatory decision. This helps inform 
and clarify the regulatory discussion. It also serves to communicate the basis 
for FDA’s regulatory decision to the public, while documenting the decision 
for reference as FDA considers similar benefit-risk assessments in the future.
The FDA framework for benefit-risk assessment is structured in terms of five 
major considerations: the analysis of severity of the disease condition being 
targeted by the drug; a review of current treatment options to determine the 
degree of unmet medical need; benefits observed in clinical trials; risks re-
flected by the safety findings from clinical trials; and consideration of whether 
the identified risks can be managed to ensure benefits would exceed risks. 
Each of these considerations is further structured into two areas to identify 
(a) the facts that are known versus residual uncertainties for each consid-
eration, and (b) the conclusions and reasons of the reviewer based on their 
assessment of the evidence and uncertainties. The FDA uses a qualitative 
approach that is grounded in the quantification of data elements at the time 
of marketing approval. Benefits are grounded on data on efficacy endpoints 
from controlled clinical trials. Risks are grounded on data on harms reported 
in clinical trials and from spontaneous adverse effect reports. The evaluation 
of benefits and risks is dynamic, with understandings of both benefits and 
risks evolving over the product life cycle. 
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FDA developed the Patient-Focused Drug Development program (PFDD) in 
recognition that patients are uniquely qualified to inform clinical context for 
FDA’s benefit-risk assessment: in particular the impact of disease on patients, 
i.e., the analysis of condition, and the effectiveness of currently available 
therapies in treating the disease impacts that matter most to patients. The 
traditional patient representative program only enabled participation of indi-
vidual patients who receive conflict of interest screening and some regulatory 
process training, and those patient representatives have had the burden of 
speaking for all those with a disease. Yet one size does not fit all who are 
afflicted with a given disease. The FDA needed more diversity. In a pilot ex-
ercise, FDA set up 20 public meetings each focused on a different disease 
area. Only patients are allowed to speak. The meetings held since the start of 
this initiative in 2013 have been well-attended by patients and have provided 
powerful insights for FDA reviewers and also for industry sponsors who have 
attended the meetings. Public stakeholders and industry have identified this 
initiative as a priority for further expansion in the coming years. 
The FDA established ‘Breakthrough Therapy Designation’ to foster the more 
rapid development of drugs that offer the potential of substantial improve-
ment in patient outcome. The FDA Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA) of 
2012 Section 902 provided for a new ‘Breakthrough Therapy Designation.’ 
A breakthrough therapy is a drug which: (a) is intended alone or in combi-
nation with one or more other drugs to treat a serious or life-threatening 
disease or condition; and (b) preliminary clinical evidence indicates that the 
drug may demonstrate substantial improvement over existing therapies on 
one or more clinically significant endpoints, such as substantial treatment 
effects observed early in clinical development. Breakthrough designation is 
based on preliminary clinical evidence of potential improvement on a clinically 
significant endpoint relative to available therapies. By contrast, fast track 
designation is based on nonclinical or clinical evidence of the potential to 
address unmet medical needs. Both Breakthrough and Fast Track programs 
are intended to expedite the development and review of drugs for serious or 
life-threatening conditions. 
If a drug is designated as a breakthrough therapy, FDA will expedite devel-
opment and review of the drug. The program established a rolling review 
process with additional engagement between FDA staff and applicants. 
Prequalification based on the criteria outlined in Section 902 is required. Re-
quests for breakthrough designation may be submitted with the Investigation 
of New Drug (IND) application with at least one phase one trial complete. 
Breakthrough designation has substantial benefits to the sponsor, with almost 
unlimited meetings to discuss study designs and development processes 
to avoid delays and mistakes. These measures have reduced clinical de-
velopment time by half, down from an average of 7 to 10 years, with clear 
benefits for sponsors seeking to reduce development costs and patients 
seeking earlier access. As of June 2016, 440 applications for breakthrough 
designation had been submitted and 144 applications had been accepted. 
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2.4.5 
Conclusions: existing differences, current 
trends and emerging challenges
The European Union and the United States have been converging in their 
approaches to drug licensing, but some differences remain. There are sub-
stantial similarities in the US and European approaches to risk management. 
There are substantial flexibility and differentiation within both EU and US 
processes, with degrees of acceleration, strength of controls on initial use, 
and reliance on adaptive elements tuned to patient interests in safety, efficacy 
and early access to address unmet needs. Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
there do not appear to be differences in attitude to risk on population level, 
but some differences in regulation on a case by case basis. With reference to 
speed, the US FDA approves cancer drugs more quickly than the EU EMA. 
With reference to process, the US FDA is more demanding than the EMA for 
biosimilars.5 The EU offers generalised handling of Patient-Reported Outcome 
Measures (PROMS) while the US retains a symptom-specific approach. With 
reference to outcomes in licensing of oncology drugs, 50 percent of drugs are 
treated identically, 30 percent of drugs have some differences in labelling and 
in 20 percent of cases a drug is accepted by one and rejected by the other. 
The US and EU share common goals, with similar upstream pre-licensing 
processes, similar policies addressing quality problems in illicit, counterfeit 
and illegal drugs, albeit with some differences in implementation.
There are differences between the European Union and the United States in 
post-licensing downstream risk management. Most downstream differences 
are a product not of philosophical differences but of sharp differences in 
the structure of reimbursement. The EU has public payers while the US has 
a plethora of public and private payers. Within Europe, payer policies on 
reimbursement may control off-label use and limit inappropriate utilisation 
and prescription. Within the US, the FDA may indirectly affect utilisation and 
prescription by altering labels and issuing warnings, thereby reshaping liability 
exposure and altering payer and provider behaviour. European public payers 
had a theoretical option to ‘dereimburse’ drugs if warranted by emerging 
evidence on safety or effectiveness. Although not widely used, a payer-based 
approach to adherence could be used to encourage physicians and patients 
to practice evidence-based medicine, with practices updated on the basis of 
emerging information. Alignment of payer requirements may simultaneously 
strengthen incentives to improve practices while reducing delays in access 
and costs caused by variations in payer standards for effectiveness. 
Looking ahead, present trends suggest continuing convergence, further 
reducing the potential for international conflict over licensing and reimburse-
ment issues. In both the US and EU, we can expect to see greater patient 
involvement in defining meaningful benefit and willingness to accept risks, 
with lifecycle approaches to the management of risks of product and with 
integrated assessments of benefits as well as risks. Environmental changes 
have increased demand for adaptive approaches to benefit risk management 
and that enable the transition from traditional to adaptive approaches. How-
5 A biosimilar is a biologic medical product which is almost an identical copy of an original product that is manufactured by a different 
company.
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ever, significant challenges remain if the potential benefits of de facto and 
de jure adaptive approaches to licensing are to be realized. 
Some potential problems are technocratic and legal. Adaptive approaches 
to risk governance require the integration of lessons from post-marketing 
observational data and data from controlled clinical trials in a manner that 
compensates for the weaknesses of each. Observational data including payer 
records and electronic health records are subject to selection biases, misrep-
resentations of indications, simple errors and noise, presenting problems in 
terms of internal validity of inferences. The development of methods of data 
standardisation and curation and methods of causal inference suited to data 
with biases and selection effects present technical challenges. Clinical trials 
of limited duration, with high patient adherence in populations cleansed of 
comorbidities and use of other drugs present problems in terms of external 
validity – generalisation from trials to ordinary treatment populations. The 
integration of observational and trial based information, including working 
back from hypotheses generated from post-market observational data to 
limited trials to confirmatory targeted trials, presents legal as well as technical 
challenges. To make adaptive approaches function effectively will require 
work on terms of access to data, including intellectual property rights, human 
subject protocols and privacy rules. 
Some potential problems are political and economic. First, experience has 
shown that it is politically challenging to remove a drug from the market or to 
restrict payment should the initial benefit-risk balance not be confirmed post 
approval. Once patients have access to a drug, resistance to withdrawal can 
be intense. These issues will require substantial discussion before rather than 
after conditional approval of drugs, with the inclusion of patient groups as 
critical stakeholders. Second, once early access is obtained, not all develop-
ers will be interested in making good on controls, observation and potential 
narrowing of terms of access that constitute the ‘back end’ of adaptive 
licensing. Care must be taken to ensure that this post-marketing ‘back-end’ 
of adaptive licensing is fully implemented. Controls on initial prescriptions, 
systematic post-marketing observation of safety and effectiveness of drugs-
as-used, and modification of the terms of licensing and reimbursement based 
on real-world experience are critical to effective management of uncertainty 
over the life cycle of drugs. In practice, this will depend on engagement with 
payers – with a clear interest in evaluating effectiveness - as well as sponsors. 
Finally, implementation of adaptive approaches to licensing will be more 
difficult in the US than the EU. For example, limiting access to an approved 
drug to a subset of the population will be more difficult in the US, where the 
practice of medicine allows for off-label use, than in the EU. While sponsors, 
regulators, HTA bodies and payers are now collaborating in the EU, other 
jurisdictions, notably the US, do not have national healthcare systems with 
centralised management on access and payment. Conditions within the EU 
have allowed the EMA to conduct pilot projects to assess the feasibility of 
adaptive approaches to regulation. At the end of the day, the characteristics 
of adaptive approaches to licensing will be shaped by differences in national 







The preceding Chapters offered a comparison of the pattern of risk regulation 
in Europe and the United States overall and in four key sectors – food, auto-
mobiles, chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Chapter 3 collects these findings 
and offers suggestions for future directions. This study is descriptive, and 
does not analyse the numerous factors that may explain why regulatory 
policies have arisen in the way they have, nor does it make suggestions as 
to which approaches may be preferable or recommendations as to how to 
resolve differences on specific regulations. This concluding Chapter 3 does 
offer concluding insights for fostering transatlantic and international regulatory 
cooperation and regulatory improvement.
3.1 A caveat on the effects of regulatory 
differences on industry practice
The variation in regulatory standards examined in Chapters 1 and 2 is impor-
tant, but it is not fully determinative of industry practice in response to those 
regulations and thus the products, benefits and risks that societies face. To 
begin with, there can be a difference between the law on the books and the 
law in action. For example, some regulatory standards might be effectively 
monitored and enforced, but others only weakly, so knowing the official 
standard may not fully predict compliance or behaviour. And the process of 
regulatory decision making may be similar in some respects but different in 
others, so that opportunities for public input, executive oversight and judicial 
review occur at different timing and with different influence in each system 
(Parker and Alemanno 2015).
In addition, even in full compliance, industry might respond to differences 
in regulatory standards across jurisdictions (such as the EU and the US) in 
several ways, producing: 
(i) A different product to meet the different regulatory standard in each ju-
risdiction and thus selling a variety of products matched to the variety of 
regulations. 
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Or (ii) a single product that meets the most stringent regulatory standard in 
any jurisdiction and thus selling one product everywhere. 
Or perhaps (iii) an intermediate version, such as an industry producing two 
products to meet five different regulatory standards. 
Or (iv) a more fine-grained version, in which each firm (enterprise) in the 
industry chooses a different strategy (e.g. multiple products or one product) 
to sell its product(s) in multiple jurisdictions with multiple varying regulatory 
standards.
Or (v) only making the product for its own jurisdiction, and not exporting it to 
the other jurisdiction at all (because the other jurisdiction is more restrictive, 
or bans the product).
Do industries produce one product to meet the most stringent standard 
everywhere, or differentiated products to meet different standards in each 
jurisdiction? The answer may vary by sector/industry (or by firm within an 
industry), and by specific regulatory standard – because different industries 
(or firms) may face different costs of compliance, and different costs of pro-
ducing differentiated products, under these different standards. Meanwhile, 
the jurisdictions that initially had different regulatory standards may evolve 
toward a single standard, through a ‘race to the bottom’ (relaxing standards 
to reduce costs and thereby attract industry away from competing jurisdic-
tions) or a ‘race to the top’ (tightening standards to raise societal protection 
levels and thereby attract voters away from competing jurisdictions) (Bradford 
2012). Which patterns occur is an empirical question and difficult to predict.
It is difficult to find strong evidence on this question. Our case studies in 4 
key sectors, presented in Chapter 2, addressed the regulatory standards in 
effect, and did not explore the ensuing industry responses at the sector or 
firm level, nor did they identify strategic ‘race’ behaviour by the involved juris-
dictions. A few examples are evident: Food producers make some foods for 
one jurisdiction and not the other (e.g. GMO foods, chlorine-washed chicken, 
foods containing trans fats, unpasteurized cheeses, and foods containing 
hidden toys). Automobile manufacturers make some variations in models 
so that the vehicles can meet different standards in different jurisdictions, 
such as a different vehicle model for the US and for Europe, and a different 
emissions system for California than for the rest of the US (as allowed under 
the US Clean Air Act), even though the manufacturers would prefer to make 
a single global vehicle model (Center for Automotive Research 2016). Some 
chemicals are marketed in one jurisdiction but not the other (e.g. pesticides). 
And some pharmaceuticals are marketed in one jurisdiction (e.g. Tylenol/
acetaminophen) while an apparently similar pharmaceutical is marketed in 
the other jurisdiction (Panadol/paracetamol). These are illustrative examples. 
A much broader empirical research project would be needed to characterize 
the actual variation in industry practices in each product sector.
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3.2 Findings
This report has sought to examine the similarities and differences in EU and 
US regulation, overall and especially in 4 key sectors: Food, Automobiles, 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals.
A major finding is that the reality of transatlantic regulation is not a simple 
dichotomy of a European approach versus an American approach. It is not 
EU precaution versus US reaction, or ex-ante versus ex-post legal systems, 
or civil law versus common law, or uncertainty-based versus evidence-based 
regulatory systems. Rather, the reality is parity and particularity: both overall 
EU-US similarity, and also selective application of precaution on both sides 
of the Atlantic, including both cases of greater European precaution or strin-
gency and cases of greater US precaution or stringency. 
Evidence for this complex reality has been presented in earlier research, 
summarised in Chapter 1 above (e.g. Sand 2000; Zander 2010; Wiener et al. 
2011; Wiener et al. 2013). Our case studies in 4 sectors, although they are 
not a random or representative sample of all regulation, help illustrate this 
more complex reality. They are summarised below.
Sector Case Comparison
1 Food Safety GM Foods / Crops /  
Fish
EU more precautionary
2 Food Safety Hormones in Beef EU more precautionary
3 Food Safety Antibiotics EU more protective
4 Food Safety Mad Cow  
(BSE/vCJD)
US more precautionary, especially regarding blood
5 Food Safety Pesticides US ADIs more protective than EU MRLs
6 Food Safety Organic Convergence on agreed standards
7 Food Safety Chlorine-washed 
poultry
EU more precautionary regarding chlorine (US more precautionary 
regarding salmonella?)
8 Food Safety Trans fats US more precautionary in labelling and phase-out of trans fats
9 Food Safety Unpasteurised dairy US more precautionary
10 Food Safety Choking hazards US more precautionary 
11 Automobiles Safety Approximately equivalent results, yet differences in numerous reg-
ulatory specifications. Opportunity for regulatory cooperation on 
autonomous vehicles.
12 Automobiles Emissions US more precautionary as to NOx, PM, etc.
13 Chemicals EU REACH may be more precautionary than US TSCA, but both are 
complex systems, and both are precautionary in key aspects. US 
Lautenberg Act (TSCA reform legislation, enacted June 2016) adds 
precautionary elements. 
14 Pharmaceuticals US FDA and EMA have some differences, with convergence on sev-
eral key aspects. Distinctive pathways toward improved benefit-risk 
management and adaptive licensing.
Table 2: Findings in 4 Sectors 
(based on Chapter 2)
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To be sure, the number of cases studied here that reflect greater EU or greater 
US precaution are not necessarily representative of the full array of policies, 
products and services. This is not a contest to count the number of cases on 
each side. Nor can generalized patterns be inferred from these cases. Still, 
they do illustrate the complex pattern, and undermine claims of greater EU 
(or US) precaution across the board.
3.3 Implications for trade agreements  
and international regulatory cooperation
The transatlantic regulatory differences that exist, even if they are unusual 
deviations from typical parity, and even if they go in both directions, can still 
pose barriers to trade. Regulatory differences can complicate trade both 
for large enterprises and perhaps especially for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Converging regulatory standards could potentially re-
duce such barriers and enhance trade for mutual benefit. At the same time, 
converging regulatory standards to reduce barriers to trade may raise a con-
cern that doing so might entail relaxing regulatory protections on one side. 
For those who hold the comparative viewpoint discussed above – the view 
that European regulatory standards are always or generally more protective 
than US regulatory standards – the concern may be that reducing regulatory 
barriers to trade would entail weakening European regulatory protections. 
This concern has been expressed as a criticism of regional trade agreements, 
and could also arise regarding international regulatory cooperation outside 
trade agreements. 
But even if this comparative viewpoint were accurate, it would not nec-
essarily follow that harmonizing standards requires weakening European 
regulatory protections, because the trade agreement could ‘harmonise up’ 
to the more stringent standards, rather than ‘harmonise down’ to the less 
stringent standards. 
Further, as this comparative viewpoint (that European standards are generally 
more stringent) is inaccurate – because the reality, as described above, is a 
more complex array of EU-US parity and particularity, going in both directions 
(sometimes more stringent European protections, sometimes more stringent 
US protections) – then converging transatlantic regulations could entail a 
mix of changes that makes (some) protections more stringent on each side. 
International regulatory cooperation does not necessarily entail choosing one 
side’s current standard over the other. The question is not which side can 
impose its regulation on the other, but whether together they can learn from 
experience with regulations on both sides of the Atlantic, and adopt the best 
approach – which may be the current approach on one side or other, or a third 
new approach. Current variation in policies can inform better future choices 
(Wiener and Alemanno 2015). There is scientific uncertainty and regulatory 
ambiguity on each side of the Atlantic, and it may be worthwhile to review 
the regulatory differences that do occur (often without great controversy) and 
find solutions that are scientifically sound and improve societal well-being. 
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There may be a few cases that trigger strong feelings, and several that offer 
opportunities for learning from variation. 
Further, international regulatory cooperation can proceed even if large regional 
trade negotiations do not. Specific agencies and ministries can cooperate 
on particular policies, and regulatory oversight bodies such as US OIRA and 
the EU RSB can cooperate on approaches to ex ante impact assessment, 
retrospective review and evaluation, and improved regulatory design.
In some instances, differences in regulatory practices do not have clear 
implications for trade. For example, variations in US and EU practices in 
pharmaceuticals licensing and reimbursement are not easily characterized as 
differences in regulatory stringency and do not translate into a simple list of 
priorities for trade negotiations. In pharmaceuticals, variations in regulatory 
policies and reimbursement policies may not confer systematic advantages 
for firms in the US or EU that then become the focus for trade negotiations. 
While licensing and reimbursement policies may have some effect on the 
location and magnitude of investments, the implications for US and EU trade 
negotiations are limited. The modern pharmaceuticals sector is transnational, 
with headquarters and subsidiaries of indistinct nationality. 
3.4 Learning from regulatory variation
The variation that we observe across risk regulations in the US and Europe 
can also be a source of learning. Different regulatory standards and instru-
ments can yield different results: different effectiveness in achieving intended 
outcomes, and also different social costs and ancillary impacts (unintended 
consequences, such as countervailing harms or co-benefits). 
Rather than only seeking to achieve harmonisation or convergence on reg-
ulations, efforts at international regulatory cooperation could also create a 
platform for continuing study and learning from regulatory variation (Listokin 
2008; Wiener and Alemanno 2015). Just as variation across member states 
within a federal system offers a crucial ‘laboratory’ to test alternative poli-
cy approaches, variation across the regulations in the US and Europe can 
serve as a ‘transatlantic policy laboratory’ – a step toward a ‘global policy 
laboratory’ that can improve our understanding of regulatory performance, 
consequences, and innovation (Wiener and Alemanno 2015). Purposeful 
experiments could be conducted to test and compare regulatory approach-
es (Greenstone 2009; Ludwig et al. 2011; van Gestel and van Dijck 2011). 
Converging on a single standard through international regulatory cooperation 
begs the question of which standard to converge upon – and it may reduce 
trade barriers, but could also lead to errors in the selection of the standard on 
which to converge (with associated undesirable social outcomes). Studying 
the actual outcomes associated with regulatory variation can be essential 
to avoiding such errors.
Both the US and Europe could benefit from such learning – to improve ef-
fectiveness, lower costs and ancillary harms, and reduce unnecessary trade 
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barriers. Successful learning from regulatory variation will require careful work 
to collect data, structure comparisons, and evaluate results through retro-
spective impact assessments. We suggest that this process can be launched 
or augmented through efforts at international regulatory cooperation. For 
example, EU and US ministries/agencies could conduct joint or parallel 
evaluations of existing regulations to assess their empirical impacts and 
which policy design elements are most effective or yield optimal outcomes. 
And the EU Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) and US OIRA could conduct 
joint or parallel evaluations of multiple regulations to assess policy designs. 
Independent bodies, such as national academies of science, and academic 
research groups at think tanks and universities (perhaps supported by private 
foundations), could also provide such data collection and evaluative research 
to learn from regulatory variation. Combining the research efforts of both US 
and EU entities could enable a more capable policy laboratory yielding better 
learning from regulatory variation.
3.5 Toward planned adaptive regulation
Further, efforts at international regulatory cooperation, whether through coop-
eration among regulatory agencies (ministries), cooperation among regulatory 
oversight bodies (such as US OIRA and EU RSB), international trade nego-
tiations, or other modes, could promote planned adaptive regulation (PAR). 
PAR is an approach in which each regulation is designed from its initiation 
to learn from experience and update over time (Greenstone 2009; McCray, 
Oye and Petersen 2010).6 Global and US–EU policy laboratories for regula-
tion, noted above, can also facilitate experimentation with different ways to 
design and implement PAR.
PAR is a policy tool which risk regulators have not sufficiently attempted 
in practice. PAR sounds logical: in the face of uncertain evidence that was 
used to underpin a rule, regulators plan both for scheduled adaptation of 
the rule and for the production of decision-relevant knowledge that further 
characterises or reduces the uncertainties pertaining to the risk regulated. It is 
actually rare to see this purposeful combination of planning for future review 
and revision, for instance periodic review, and funding targeted research, in 
a way that is credibly overseen for quality and relevance, and that explicitly 
feeds into the reassessment of the knowledge base. One example, where 
regulators have learned from each other on both sides of the ocean, is the 
regulation of criteria pollutants in the atmosphere, the US National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) and the European Air Quality Standards (Petersen 
et al. 2006). Under the US Clean Air Act, the NAAQS require reviews every 
5 years. As another example, in the new Lautenberg Chemical Safety Act 
(LCSA) (June 22, 2016), section 26(L) embodies a similar version of planned 
adaptive regulation. Key text in section 26(L) reads: 
6 PAR has been the topic of a conference organised by IRGC and University College London in January 2016. The conference report 
is available from www.irgc.org/event/planning-adaptive-risk-regulation.
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‘(1) DEVELOPMENT - Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of 
the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, the 
Administrator shall develop any policies, procedures, and guidance the 
Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the amendments to 
this Act made by the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st 
Century Act. 
(2) REVIEW - Not later than 5 years after the date of enactment of the Frank 
R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, and not less 
frequently than once every 5 years thereafter, the Administrator shall— 
(a) review the adequacy of the policies, procedures, and guidance 
developed under paragraph (1), including with respect to animal, 
non-animal, and epidemiological test methods and procedures for 
assessing and determining risk under this title; and 
(b) revise such policies, procedures, and guidance as the Administra-
tor determines necessary to reflect new scientific developments or 
understandings.’
PAR requires an initial intention to incorporate learning into the life of a regu-
latory standard. It requires some form of data collection and periodic analysis 
of these data. Whereas efforts at “retrospective review” of regulation to date 
have often been ad hoc and without initial plans for data collection and anal-
ysis (Wiener and Ribeiro 2016b), PAR depends on such advance planning for 
monitoring, data collection, and evaluation over time. It involves a series of 
repeated occasions for policy makers to review these analyses and consider 
making revisions to the regulation. The duration of the interval period for each 
analysis and review (i.e. the frequency of such reviews) is a key choice, and 
may need to match the expected pace of change that the PAR approach is 
trying to manage in each area, while avoiding so much instability that the 
costs of compliance rise too high and/or the incentives for investment in 
the regulated industry fall too low. Another key choice is whether the review 
period is an opportunity for review (at least a nudge to policy makers to 
consider revisions at regular intervals), or an obligation (in the sense that 
the regulation would terminate (sunset) unless the review is carried out and 
recommends continuation or revision of the regulation). A further question is 
who should conduct the analysis and review – e.g. the staff of the ministry 
that developed the initial regulation, or an oversight body, or an independent 
outside body. The regulating ministry may have greater knowledge about the 
regulation, but also disincentives to reviewing it and reporting publicly on that 
review, whereas outside bodies may be more objective reviewers but lack key 
knowledge (Wiener and Ribeiro 2016b). Despite these important challenges, 
PAR offers the potential of incorporating continual iterative improvement into 
otherwise static regulatory systems.
The general idea that governments (e.g. the EU or the US governments) 
should not ignore evolving evidence on the actual effects of their existing rules 
is one that has actually had a lively history in administrative law on both sides 
of the ocean. In the EU, many Directives have had review clauses inserted 
in them, with evidence gathering and involvement of stakeholders appear-
ing as common elements in such scheduled reviews. In the US, as early as 
1946, the Administrative Procedure Act laid out an explicit provision allowing 
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interested and affected groups to ask for the amendment of an existing rule, 
and the authorizing Federal agency cannot decline to consider such requests 
without explaining why. Subsequent Presidents from both political parties 
have issued Executive Orders calling on agencies to review existing rules and 
to revise or rescind them as needed (e.g. President Carter’s Executive Order 
12044 (1978), President Clinton’s Executive Order 12866, section 5 (1993), 
President Obama’s Executive Order 13563 (2011) and President Trump’s 
Executive Order 13771 (2017)). But it has been difficult to mobilize agencies 
to collect data on regulatory performance, and to conduct and report their 
retrospective reviews (McCray, Oye and Petersen 2010; Bull 2015; Wiener 
and Ribeiro 2016b). 
While the demand for self-corrective mechanisms in regulation is persistent 
as a general nonpartisan “good government” principle, it seems to have 
been unpopular in application. Recently, though, we have seen an increasing 
number of examples of the implementation of Planned Adaptive Regulation, 
for example in Dutch Delta Management, in US and EU air quality regulation, 
in the adaptive licensing of new drugs by the European Medicines Agency, 
and in US synthetic biology regulation. 
There are several reasons behind the unpopularity of PAR in the past, the 
precise causes of which deserve fuller study. While academics and some 
government leaders might lean toward it, public bureaucracies often prefer 
the status quo to new ways. Conducting reviews of ongoing policies can be 
costly and time-consuming (and an unfavourable review may be awkward 
for the agency). Regulatory agencies are busy, and reviewing past policies 
can be a low priority for agency officials compared to implementing new laws 
and addressing new problems. Budgets for data collection, analysing and 
writing rules are already stretched, and re-examining past rules can look like 
an unaffordable luxury in bureaucracies. A new study finds that in practice, 
retrospective review has made only slow progress, likely for these reasons, 
but that it could do better if aimed less at revising individual rules and more 
at learning to improve the accuracy of ex ante impact assessments and at 
learning to improve policy designs by studying multiple rules – tasks that 
could be conducted outside the regulatory agencies, easing their burden 
(Wiener and Ribeiro 2016b). Thus there may be a role for outside groups to 
propose and conduct ongoing data collection and evaluation.
A further reason to be wary of repeated revisions is the need for regulations 
to be enforceable and credible to those who must comply with them. The 
anticipation of revision may undermine the credibility and perceived fairness of 
the initial rule, and thus weaken industry compliance. Also an agency's public 
reputation may be threatened. In policy, as in politics, “flip-flopping” is an 
unappealing trait. It may imply weakness or, worse, unprincipled malleability 
in the face of political pressure. Interest groups may prefer more enduring 
deals (Gubler 2014). On the other hand, the prospect of revisions may enable 
some stakeholders to agree to the adoption of an initial regulation that they 
would otherwise have opposed. 
Concerns about accountability and predictability of PAR are often raised 
through public criticisms of regulations from external groups, both groups 
that want tougher regulation and those that want milder regulation. In some 
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cases, regulated interests and their usual opponents (consumer, environmen-
tal, and other advocates) might form a constituency favouring the re-visiting 
of existing rules. It is common, for example, for some subset of contending 
parties to feel that a regulatory agency has reached the wrong conclusion in 
writing a new rule. One might expect that such aggrieved interests groups 
would favour both the systematic gathering of new evidence on the actual 
costs and benefits of the rule and the subsequent reopening of what seems to 
them to be a flawed decision. On the other hand, some regulated actors may 
favour maintaining the current regulation, if it gives these actors competitive 
advantages over their rivals or new entrants (Smith and Yandle 2014; Wiener 
and Richman 2010); periodic updating of the regulation might reduce such 
barriers to entry and competition (though, depending on its content, each 
periodic update could also raise a new barrier). 
PAR does not have to involve radical policy change. Regulation can be up-
dated within pre-defined limits or objectives, if administrative law does not 
pose too tight a constraint (Gubler 2014). This allows the introduction of 
performance-based management, with a view to reaching more effective-
ly and flexibly an initially determined performance objective (an approach 
already in place in Europe in many sectors, such as automobile safety). 
For example, the jurisdictions could coordinate experimentation, with one 
conducting a pilot policy treatment while the other acts as a control group, 
or the two jurisdictions could agree to experiment with two different policy 
treatments, and then compare results. Thus, PAR can be a mechanism for 
policy learning – from regulatory variation across countries (Wiener and Ale-
manno 2015), and from experimentation and accumulation of knowledge 
over time (Greenstone 2009; McCray, Oye and Petersen 2010) – to improve 
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